Ruin, Repair, and Responsibility

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Abstract

‘Ruin, Repair, and Responsibility’ explores and Arendtian conceptualization of the three and their interrelations. At issue is how to understand (a) ruin in its socio-historical specificity but also in terms of what it is that breaks down in the weave of human relations, (b) the possibility or impossibility of repair, and (c) what responsibility may mean when repair is impossible since the very conditions for its possibility have been destroyed.

Keywords: forgiveness; mourning; politics; promise; trauma; violence

I

In both The Human Condition and the Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, Hannah Arendt describes philosophy, which she takes to have started with the Greeks, as exhibiting a suspicion and degradation of earthly life because, unlike the life of the Olympian gods, it is ‘troublesome, full of worries, cares, griefs, and sorrows’. Earthly life and the whole realm of human affairs is noisy and haphazard, and thus very different from the eternal entities of philosophical contemplation, which, as a result, must occur ‘outside the plurality of men’. Philosophy and the philosophical attitude, according to Arendt, are, in this sense, escapist, yet at the same time not too different from either religion and the religious attitude which prioritize a relationship with unearthly divinity and in the case of Christianity death as the gate to the afterlife, or from current techno-science and the techno-scientific attitude whose points of view are fully articulable only mathematically and hence esoterically, and, as a result, are quite literally growing more and more distant from earth and life on it.

Arendt’s description of philosophy and the philosophical attitude is not intended as an intervention or provocation. Instead, it is used to distinguish them from modes of reflection that, while theoretical insofar as they involve conjectural generalizations and imaginative conceptions, are, nonetheless, engaged with earthly life and the confusing messiness of human affairs. The engaged modes of reflection include ‘understanding’, which is endeavoured in order to make, even if long-term, always truly temporary sense of
something that has happened without falling back on causal explanations, and ‘critical thinking’, which, while modest in terms of its aspirations, publicly applies discriminating and exact standards to thought itself, demanding accounts for beliefs and opinions which are, then, submitted to a thorough examination.

I believe that the Arendtean modes of unphilosophical engaged thoughtful attention are particularly important when one is trying to ponder about ‘dark times’ and the kind of life-world ruination that is entwined with them and that Arendt believes Brecht describes in his poem ‘To Posterity’, from which she borrows the term. There are, I think, many ways to describe a life-world’s wreckage, because as Kirby Farrell suggests in *Post-Traumatic Culture*, the damage brought about by devastations like the First World War and the Second World War and other events of the first part of the century to which Brecht was responding is registered throughout the culture. But, in the case of the West, it is necessary to go farther than Brecht, since the rise of the West is marked by a variety of stresses and the ‘period is a bloody saga of factional violence, religious浩劫, and lawlessness, in societies racked by intermittent famine and plague’. During this time, Farrell adds, ‘survival anxiety and exterminatory fury fed on each other with consequences such as the witchcraft mania, the Hundred Years War, and the New World genocide, which are comparable to the atrocities of the twentieth century’.

Farrell uses the language of trauma to speak about the degradation of the Western world from its very inception and the life-worlds it touched on. As he notes, following the psychological literature on the subject, in clinical language trauma signifies an acute injury that overwhelms ordinary responses and results in a delayed reaction, evoking a need for an interpretation of the terror that is otherwise managed by a psychic disassociation that spacio-temporally freezes it. Farrell himself does not evaluate the interpretations of trauma that he reads, though he is aware of their ideological uses. Indeed, according to Farrell, trauma has been and continues to be used manipulatively or ritually and symbolically to bond people together. Yet, where Farrell sees such connection as politically neutral because it is not different from other social attachments and because it can take on conservative, liberal, and leftist interpretations alike, Wendy Brown implies in *States of Injury* that trauma based political association leads to a politics of vengeful *ressentiment*. Trauma, according to Brown, requires something akin to political therapy, possible only under radically democratic conditions which can facilitate hearing the pain caused by the traumatizing injury in such a way that it can be overcome.

Brown’s point, I think, is well taken and Arendt, as careful a reader of Nietzsche as Brown, was well aware of it. Indeed she can be read as among the first to offer a sustained analysis of a historically specific attempt at a trauma-centred politics. Her critique of the French Revolution describes
how politically focusing on misery necessarily leads to terror, thereby undermining politics itself since politics entails contestation where the summons of the suffering is incontrovertible. As Arendt already observes in *The Human Condition*, pain blots out everything else, and at the same time, is in some sense incommunicable, both of which result in its relative ‘privacy’. Pain comes into the public when it is the locus of politics. Once in public, pain, still in its own way incommunicable, begins to smudge and blur everything else, for it commands attention with its demands for immediate relief. This diminishes and can even eliminate the space of politics altogether.

The space of politics is, according to Arendt, not a physical space but a space that exists between people and arises out of political action itself when people organize together in order to act politically. This is a space that cannot be inhabited by anyone all the time and it does not always exist, not surviving the end of the movements that bring it into being or when the activities of these movements are managed and contained. It is quite fragile and cannot be made otherwise, a point that Arendt expresses poignantly: ‘[w]herever people gather together, it is potentially there, but only potentially, not necessarily, and not forever’.

There is an aspect of the space of politics that is not emphasized enough by the above and without which the operations of pain in public are not clear. This aspect is hidden in the assertion that the space of politics exists between people. One could take this as saying not only that politics is relational but also that it presupposes or results in unity. But for Arendt the relationality of politics does not require or indicate a unity of political actors. On the contrary, the Arendtian space of politics is a space of human plurality, both highlighting it and profoundly depending on it. Pain, even in public, is self-referential, and the manner in which it commands attention is intolerant of plurality, though sometimes, at least strategically, it admits the possibility of a plurality of pain.

II

The harmful effects that politically centred pain has on the space of politics is secondary rather than primary. According to Arendt, the space of politics succumbs first and foremost to violence, the source of much of the pain that can be politically centred. In some ways violence resembles pain, being, like it, beyond communication and capable of immediately capturing and commanding attention. How violence functions when it enters the public may, however, make better sense not only through its comparison to pain but when it is thought of with reference to the ‘glues’ that help hold the space of politics together – promise and forgiveness.

For Arendt, sociality as such is not among the ‘glues’ of the space of politics. Political relationality is not grounded in or dependent on it. Political relationality takes place among individuals who are equally free and equally capable of political action and who ‘never can guarantee today who they
Political action, like political actors, is unpredictable so far as its consequences are concerned ‘since action acts upon beings who are capable of their own actions’, which suggests that a reaction is never merely a response but ‘is always a new action that strikes out on its own and affects others’. Unpredictability leads to anxiety, and promise and forgiveness, the ‘glues’ of the space of politics, mediate it subtly and without substantially modifying the equality of political actors on the one hand and the free character of action on the other.

Promise, Arendt asserts in an interesting take on contract theory, is a binding performative that when given and accepted operates like a ‘reliable guidepost’ and creates a capacity to ‘dispose of the future as if it was the present’. Forgiveness, which Arendt appropriates from Christianity believing that its sources are actually political, which like promise is also a performative, counters the risks of action quite differently from promise because what it is about is the irreversibility of what one does. What the performance of forgiveness accomplishes is a release from the consequences of what one has done which otherwise one would have been shackled by, being perceived as if they sprang from one’s essence and therefore as if one could not act differently. Forgiveness thus reconstitutes the freedom to act politically. Summarizing her claims on promise and forgiveness Arendt states that they ‘belong together insofar as . . . forgiving serves to undo the deeds of the past . . . and . . . binding oneself through promises serves to set up in the ocean of uncertainty, which the future is by definition, islands of security, without which not even continuity, let alone durability . . . would be possible’ in human affairs.

Promise and forgiveness ‘glue’ the space of politics by delicately modulating political action. Violence, specifically the kind that can cause forms of pain that can be politically centred, is indelicate, and its entrance into the public explodes the minimal sheltering from the unpredictability of political action that is put in place by acts of promising. Moreover, it is not at all clear that violence of this kind is forgivable since the acts of forgiveness that together with acts of promising gently inflect political action are intended for everyday sorts of actions and their consequences. As Arendt points out in her interpretation of Jesus’ teachings about forgiveness, the exemplary forgivable act for him is trespassing, ‘an everyday occurrence which is in the very nature of action’s constant establishment of new relationships within a web of relations, and it needs forgiving, dismissing, in order to make it possible for life to go on’.

Unforgivable acts, Arendt states, ‘transcend the realm of human affairs’, a statement she stays true to in her critical report of the Eichmann trial, and one she first voiced when discussing the rise of totalitarianism. Yet, where there are unforgivable acts, there is a breach of the life-world that is extreme, and their transcendent nature, which makes them not even truly punishable, points at the lack of any given straightforward ways to
repair the rupture. If what has been breached can be rebuilt at all, what seems to be required is an innovative political action that somehow reinstates people as equal political actors capable of freedom, as well as of promise and forgiveness, and hence of the reconstruction of a lightly and cautiously held together space of politics.

This point, I am convinced, cannot be over-emphasized. Its importance might be clearer in a comparison with Locke, who ends his *Second Treatise of Government* with a discussion of the ‘dissolution of government’ and the ‘dissolution of society’, the product of the ‘social contract’.

Locke, who assumes that a dissolution of society and a dissolution of government are a result of a variety of transgressions, states that

> [W]hen the Government is dissolved, the People are at liberty to provide for themselves . . . For Society can never, by the fault of another, lose the Native and Original Right it has to preserve it self . . . [And] the state of Mankind is not so Miserable that they are not capable of using [a] Remedy.

As a liberal, Locke offers this passage as an argument against conservatives who are intent on prohibiting popular rebellion as an appropriate answer to elite corruption and oppression. At the same time, though, the passage suggests that Locke did not conceive of the people as profoundly affected, let alone traumatized, by the transgressions to which they are responding. The transgressions, for him, violate a contract, and because of that they free the people to exercise a right to enter an alternative to the now defunct contract. Free to exercise this right, the people are presumably as they were in the ‘state of nature’, ‘equal and independent’ and with ‘like faculties’. But this is not so, especially in the case of violence.

Jonathan Shay, a psychiatrist who works with United States Vietnam War veterans, argues in *Achilles in Vietnam* that the soldiers’ personalities changed. Among their new personality traits are

(a) a hostile or mistrustful attitude to the world;
(b) social withdrawal;
(c) feelings of emptiness or hopelessness;
(d) a chronic feeling of being ‘on the edge’ as if constantly threatened;
(e) estrangement.

Shay concludes as a result that ‘prolonged combat can wreck the personality’. He goes on to claim that among the effects of the personality changes experienced by soldiers is an inability to participate in the democratic process since ‘passionate struggle conducted within the rules of safety and fairness does not make sense to them or seems a hollow charade’.

For the soldier a struggle is always a life or death struggle, and debate and persuasion impossible because words cannot be trusted.
If Shay is right, it is obvious that where unforgivable acts were performed, then even if people are freed by them, as Locke suggests, to start again from the beginning, they have to reinvent themselves through the political acts that they perform so that once again they could be the originators of a social contract. Paradoxically, their political acts have to heal them enough to enable them to be political actors.

III

Derrida seems to suggest that a paradox of this kind must actually underlie any kind of ‘progressive’ politics. While discussing Marxism and Marx after the collapse of state-institutionalized Marxism, particularly in the USSR, where the Marxist-inspired revolution of 1917 had strong global reverberations as late as the 1970s but whose specific totalitarian forms were also resisted, at least since mid-century, Derrida claims that this collapse has reopened the question that has been asked during and since the middle of the twentieth century, when the totalitarian aspects of state-institutionalized Marxism became well known and cracked an intellectual consensus regarding its oppositional potential – ‘whither Marxism?’.

For Derrida, who is far from a Marxist in any traditional sense of the term, to ask ‘whither Marxism?’ is to ask a significant political question about one’s own Marxist inheritance, which he declares ‘one must assume’, yet only insofar as it is ‘living’. Since what is most alive for Derrida in Marx is the spirit of criticism, and since to inherit, according to him, is to ‘affirm by choosing’ and therefore affirm through ‘filtering’, ‘sifting’, and ‘criticizing’, he believes that one necessarily inherits, especially from Marx when one performs one’s ‘filtering’ of, ‘sifting’ through, and ‘criticizing’ not only others but perhaps in particular, Marx’s work, a performance which one can, of course, decline, but only at the high cost of losing one’s intellectual, and specifically Marxist, intellectual legacy. Derrida claims that intellectual succession requires all this because ‘[i]f the readability of a legacy were given, natural, transparent, univocal, if it did not call for and at the same time defy interpretation, we would never have anything to inherit from it’.

Derrida emphasizes the opacity of texts that according to Arendt became opaque as a result of the momentous historical rupture experienced in the West following the rise of totalitarianism. But, while Arendt, though aware of the force of tradition, still felt herself freed from the ‘authority of the past’ by her historical conditions, Derrida, writing almost fifty years later and after the failure in the 1960s of attempts to intervene radically with the conservative-liberal consensus and a Marxism which was already hardened, conceives of the intellectual’s freedom as an achievement that requires critical work which given the historical conditions must be intertwined with the kind of work that Freud describes as ‘the work of mourning’.
Following Freud, Derrida points out that mourning accompanies trauma, though, as Freud recognized, it is possible not to undertake the ‘work of mourning’ and instead to respond to trauma through an attempt to ‘conjure away the dead’.\textsuperscript{36} What this kind of ‘conjunction’ is expected to accomplish, according to Derrida, is the ridding of the ‘conjurer’ of any haunting by the dead, and hence any encounters with ‘ghosts’ or ‘specters’\textsuperscript{37}.

‘Conjurers’ save themselves from encounters with ‘ghosts’ or ‘specters’ by creating an enclosure for the dead. Yet for Derrida, somewhat in contradiction from Freud, who thought of the dead as remembered and of the ‘work of mourning’ as capable of conclusion, there is no boundary that cleanly separates the dead from the living, and hence no likelihood of closure to mourning, which is, consequently, ‘interminable, without possible normality, [and] without reliable limit’.\textsuperscript{38} Because Marx presents himself as, among other things, a materialist exorcist with a recipe for ridding the world of its immaterial ghosts, Derrida claims that Marx was not always critical and sometimes acted as a ‘conjurer’. According to Derrida, what this means is that as a ‘conjurer’ rather than a ‘mourner’ Marx contaminates his notion of revolution, forcing it to presuppose a forgetfulness of what inspires revolution in the first place – all the historical figures and events that can remind one that justice is an injunction projecting a horizon that can never be concretely exhausted.\textsuperscript{39}

For Derrida, the implication of critique with an emancipatory promise is inspired by a justice that is always only a horizon, and this throws his association of critique with a never-ending kind of ‘work of mourning’ into an interesting relief. What the ‘work of mourning’ does, according to Freud, is uncouple libidinal energy from a lost love-object to which it is bound. Freud writes in ‘Mourning and Melancholia’ that

\begin{quote}
The testing of reality, having shown that the loved object no longer exists, requires forthwith that all the libido shall be withdrawn from its attachments to this object. . . . The task . . . is carried out bit by bit . . . while all the time the object is continued in the mind. Each single one of the memories and hopes which bound the libido to the object is brought up and hyper-cathected, and the detachment of the libido from it is accomplished. . . . [W]hen the work of mourning is completed the ego becomes free and uninhibited again.\textsuperscript{40}
\end{quote}

According to Freud, unless the ego becomes free through the ‘work of mourning’, it has no libidinal energy that it can use to bind it to another object. According to Derrida, something like a Freudian openness to new libidinal binding is needed for any ethico-political engagement since the keeping of the justice-inspired messianic emancipatory promise must be continually reactualized in ‘new effective forms of action, practice, [and] organization’\textsuperscript{41} which will in their turn be exposed as limited in their reach.
toward the horizon of the promise of justice and, as a result, have to be forgone. For Derrida one of the things one can learn from Marx is that it is critique that exposes the gap between the horizon of the promise of justice and what exists. If so, critique is the origin of a traumatizing loss of innocence regarding positive justice that can inaugurate a ‘work of mourning’. Critique, though, also performs the specific tasks of the ‘work of mourning’, severing connections to old forms of action, practice, and organization that make it possible to connect to new ones. Both the inauguration of loss and the performance of the tasks of ‘the work of mourning’ by critique have to be continuous, or ‘interminable’, since otherwise one’s libidinal attachment to the specific forms and contents of one’s politics will necessarily undermine its ethicality, turning what should be a promise of a justice-inspired dynamic movement utterly stagnant.

By relating critique to the ‘work of mourning’, Derrida calls attention to the erotics of politics, and thus to desire, attraction, fascination, seduction, and attachment, fear of loss, forfeit, and abandonment, and defensive manoeuvres, tricks, and stratagems against surrender as aspects of political engagements. This calling of not only acknowledges the erotics of politics, but also alerts us to how problematic they are for an ethico-politics and, consequently, points to the need for critical intervention. This Derrida, because he is so concerned with that about permanence that totalizes, entrusts to critique in its deconstructive capacities, thereby positing it like a Freudian ‘talking cure’ for the kind of ‘oppressive’ categorical stenosis that he believes results from the erotics of politics.

**IV**

Derrida is hopeful, yet it is not clear why, since he does not examine any concrete historical examples of political action of the kind that he envisions as capable of resolving the paradox of political healing that traumatized political actors have to bring about through their political action. The examples of recuperative political action that Arendt is familiar with are primarily of failures. There is the failure of the French Revolution, which had such promising and inspiring beginnings but then came apart because of the political centring of misery. More recent, for Arendt, is the failure of the post-Second World War Western Allies’ attempts to ‘solve the moral, economic, and political problem of Germany’. These attempts, Arendt observes, involved the use of three devices – de-Nazification, the institutionalization of free enterprise, and federalization – all of which masked and perpetuated the problems that they were intended to take care of.

Of the three, the last, federalization, which was designed to increase political participation by forming regional and local governments, simply could not work because ‘totalitarianism kills to the roots’. The second, the institutionalization of free enterprise, handed economic control to a
class whose members were ‘at least strong supporters of the [Nazi] regime’ without allowing for a labour opposition and, therefore, exasperated economic injustices. As to the first, de-Nazification, it ‘rested on the assumption that there were objective criteria not only for clear-cut distinctions between Nazis and non-Nazis, but for the whole Nazi Hierarchy ranging from little sympathizer to war criminal’, threatened people’s livelihood and existence, evoked the usual resistance to official questioning, and led to the creation of ‘an unwholesome new community of interest among the more-or-less compromised’, who developed ‘a system of mutual assurance that the whole thing need not be taken too seriously’.

The failure of de-Nazification is, perhaps, the most disturbing of the three, especially if one does not expect an increase of opportunities to participate in governing to yield increased political action, or capitalism to yield economic justice. De-Nazification, on the other hand, is about a kind of post-confessional refashioning of identity and involves becoming ethically aware of and moved by Nazi crimes and recognizing one’s role in the matter. It is a process that involves a re-education that fundamentally changes one’s sensibilities in a manner that has become more and more expected because of the entwining of oppositional politics with the political centring of pain.

Arendt too is primarily disturbed by the failure of de-Nazification. After suggesting that conditions are comparable throughout Europe, Arendt discusses the enormity of German denial, pointing directly at shared German evasive techniques which include: talking about ‘how much Germans have suffered’ and ‘drawing a balance between German suffering and the suffering of others’, looking for the causes of the war in human nature and ‘not in the acts of the Nazi regime’, transforming ‘the reality of the death factories into a mere potentiality’ and mass murder into something that because of a natural human inclination to sinful evil everyone is capable of under all conditions, treating matters of fact as if they were the subject of equally valid opinions, and behaving altogether as if ‘absolutely nothing has happened since 1932’.

According to Arendt, the German denial and evasion are essentially the denial and evasion of responsibility. Yet, she also believes that responsibility in its juridical sense, guilt of specific crimes correlated to responsibility, is assignable to only a ‘relatively small’ number of people. For her, this is the crux of the complexity of a horrifying moral situation of ‘confront-ing a people among whom the boundaries dividing criminals from normal persons . . . have been effaced’ because totalitarianism forced everyone to take some kind of a part in the war and mass-murder machine. Since there are ‘no political solutions for the crime of administrative mass murder . . . the human need for justice can find no satisfactory reply’. At the same time, though, it is the realization of the complexity and horror of the moral situation that Arendt believes has to become the guide for one’s conduct, a guide that begins with shame at and fear of the evil that people
enact under the specific policies of expansionary imperialism and exclusionary racism, the roots of the Nazi regime, with seeds in other European and non-European countries.\footnote{53}

Right at the end of the Second World War, Arendt wrote that her response to people saying that they feel ashamed of being German is that she is ashamed of being human, a deeply personal feeling that she attributed to a sense of ‘international solidarity’. This global kind of shame, rather than the shame of being German, attests for Arendt to a realization that human beings burden each other with their enormous atrocities, and this, she believes, is what makes a new kind of political thinking and action possible. She explains all of this by appealing, probably quite aware of the irony of her appeal, to a Yom Kippur, the Jewish Day of Atonement, ritual prayer. She writes,

To follow a non-imperialistic policy and maintain a non-racist faith becomes more difficult because it becomes daily clearer how great a burden mankind is for man. Perhaps those Jews, to whose forefathers we owe the first conception of the idea of humanity, knew something about that burden when each year they used to say ‘Our Father and King, we have sinned before you’, taking not only the sins of their own community but all human offenses upon themselves. Those who today are ready to follow this road in a modern version do not content themselves with the hypocritical confession, ‘God be thanked, I am not like that’, in horror at the undreamed of potentialities of the German national character. Rather in fear and trembling, have they finally realized of what man is capable – and this is the precondition of any modern political thinking.\footnote{54}

According to Arendt, the people who follow the Yom Kippur prayer’s prescription ‘will not serve very well as functionaries of vengeance’ and are the only ones reliable enough ‘when it comes to fighting fearlessly, uncompromisingly, everywhere against the incalculable evil that men are capable of bringing about’.\footnote{55} Perhaps they are so because burdening themselves as they do, they commit themselves to inclusive community and take a disinterested responsibility for both its past and future, acting from and enabling a profound ‘care for the world.’

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\textbf{Notes}


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3 Now that the origin of philosophy in Greece is debated and the very concept of philosophy is highly contested, this very same point has been made by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in *What is Philosophy?* (French, 1991) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

4 *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*, p. 24.

5 *The Human Condition*, p. 20.


7 *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*, pp. 31–42.


10 Ibid., p. 27. For an interesting elaboration of this point see Charles Mills, *The Racial Contract* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).


16 *The Human Condition*, p. 199.


18 *The Human Condition*, p. 244.

19 Ibid., p. 190.

20 Ibid., p. 244, 245.

21 Ibid., p. 237.

22 Ibid., p. 240.

23 Ibid., p. 241.


27 Ibid., p. 459.

28 Ibid., p. 311.


*Specters of Marx*, p. 88.

Ibid., p. 16.

Ibid., p. 54. For Freud’s discussion see his 1917 ‘Mourning and Melancholia’ (German, 1917), in *General Psychological Theory: Papers on Metapsychology* (New York: Collier, 1963), pp. 164–79.


*Specters of Marx*, pp. 40–1, 47–8. ‘Conjuration’ can take a variety of forms including scholarly work, a point Derrida makes about some kinds of Marx scholarship. On writing as the ‘work of conjuration’ see also the discussion of the *Historikerstreit*, the mid-1980s debates in Germany about Nazi Germany, by Dominick LaCapra in *Representing the Holocaust: History, Theory, Trauma* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), pp. 43–68.

*Representing the Holocaust*, p. 97. In *Mourning Becomes the Law: Philosophy and Representation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1996), Gillian Rose implies that Derrida’s idea of interminable mourning is influenced by Maurice Blanchot in whose work death and dying are interminable. She suggests that for both Derrida and Blanchot mourning is a matter of pathos, but not of the kind of ‘work’ that comes to terms with the contradictory emotions aroused by bereavement (pp. 70, 122). Of interest here too is Steven Ungar’s *Scandal and Aftereffect: Blanchot and France Since 1930* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995).


‘Mourning and Melancholia’, p. 166.

*Specters of Marx*, p. 89.

This is an innovation given Kant’s very different use of ‘critique’. About this see Michel Foucault’s ‘What is Enlightenment?’, in Paul Rabinow (ed.) *Ethics, Subjectivity, and Truth* (French, 1994) (New York: The New Press, 1997), pp. 303–20


Ibid., p. 53.

Ibid., p. 349.

Ibid., p. 346.

Ibid., p. 347.

Ibid., p. 342.

Ibid., p. 343.

Hannah Arendt, ‘Organized Guilt and Universal Responsibility’, *Jewish Frontier* (January 1945), p. 21. Most recently the implication of most Germans in the doings of Nazi Germany has been discussed by Daniel Jonah Goldhagen in *Hitler’s Willing Executioners* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996), which has been criticized for its problematic scholarship.


