The Opposition of Politics and War

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At stake for this essay is the distinction between politics and war and the extent to which politics can survive war. Gender analysis reveals how high these stakes are by revealing the complexity of militarism. It also reveals the impossibility of gender identity as foundation for a more robust politics with respect to war. Instead, a non-ideal normative differentiation among kinds of violence is affirmed as that which politically cannot not be wanted.

Politics, War, and Masculinity

I begin with a brief citation from Plato’s Statesman according to which “we must not describe the art that generals practice [the mighty dreadful art of war] as statesmanship for it proves to be but a servant of statesmanship [which is the art of truly royal rule]” (Laws 628b–d). What Plato was doing here was not only distinguishing between politics and war but also prioritizing politics over war. Since even Carl von Clausewitz gave primacy to politics rather than war, believing that politics sets (or ought to set) the goals that war should accomplish, it may seem that Plato’s statesman has nothing special to offer when he positions politics over and above war. However, Plato and Clausewitz differ from each other in an important respect. Clausewitz’s (in)famous claim that “war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means” (1832/1984, 87) is quite revealing in this regard since it suggests that, for him, war and policy were entwined quite intimately. The two were so connected for Clausewitz because he believed that policy is an expression of a polity’s or allied polities’ interests against other polities and of politics as an arena in which nonviolent and violent means like war are all used in order to compel others to do as one wills. For
Plato, in contradistinction to Clausewitz, politics was not a play of interests and forces. Rather, politics is rational and this rationality, while practical, is not instrumental. Because of this, politics must always “rule” war. In addition, though, politics must not only always “rule” war—which is never “good” but, at best, only a “necessary evil,” even when it aims at peace, itself better established through reconciliation—unlike war, politics, which is sometimes a site of paternalistic controls, is, in general, not a site of coercion. Thus, after declaring in the Statesman that statesmanship is the art that shapes concern for human flourishing and thus the “art of ‘responsible charge’ of a whole community,” Plato added that one ought to differentiate between “enforced tendance” and “tendance voluntarily accepted” and that “tendance of human herds by violent control is the tyrant’s art” and “tendance freely accepted by herds of free bipeds we call statesmanship” (Statesman, 276d, e).

Plato’s language, offered in an attempt at definitional clarity, is strange and discloses a familiar paradoxical tension between commitment to and anxiety about political freedom, especially as it configures and is configured by democratic dispositions, practices, and institutions. While like many others Plato resolved the tension by opting for a very circumscribed conception of politics, he nonetheless formulated this limited and limiting conception of politics in such a way that war, even if adjoined to and flanking politics, is exterior to it, which for Plato meant that political relations involve a kind of friendship and good will toward others and are not about the conquest of others or one’s own victory.

Hannah Arendt noted in The Human Condition that the exclusion of war, hence, force, and violence, from politics typified ancient Greek self-understanding, that its politicization of speech transformed speech into a kind of performative action that replaced force and violence. She pointed out that for the ancient Greeks, “to be political, to live in a polis, meant that everything was decided through words and persuasion and not through force and violence,” force and violence being considered as “prepolitical ways to deal with people characteristic of life outside the polis” (1958, 26–27).

As Arendt was aware, life “inside the polis” was the domain of some male citizens since “life outside of the polis” included domestic life, the life to which most women and all slaves were consigned, as well as the life of other ancient Greek others, especially the barbarians who lacked not only knowledge of Greek but also general practices of performative political speech. Arendt also specifically pointed out that because Plato thought of politics in terms of rule over others, he was among those who contributed very early on to an understanding of politics as a kind of result-oriented fabrication that necessarily undermines genuine political freedom, and therefore, politics proper. Yet Arendt believed that the political idea of the polis as ancient Greeks, including Plato, formulated it can and ought to be reimagined in and for postmodernity in inclusive terms,
which at the same time recognize the enormous plurality of humanity and a consequent irreducible agonism that is a significant factor in the materialization of political freedom.

This is a challenging task because the ancient Greek understanding of politics was marred by the fact that most of those accorded “life in the polis” were reserve soldiers and military officers trained and on call for active duty if of the right age (Adcock 1957). This built into the idea of the polis a lack of separation between the civil and the military that Arendt seems to have ignored. Nancy Hartsock (1982, 1983), however, does call attention to this lack of separation between the civil and the military. She notes that Plato, in particular, was among those who help set in place a conception of politics that is articulated in terms that not only construe it as an attempt to bring the dangerously irrational and disorderly under some kind of governing law, but also as a mostly male (with some masculinized women) “barrack community” modeled on the Spartan military quarters and composed of male citizen-soldiers.

Modernity obscures what is problematic about the idea of the citizen-soldier. Ever since the French Revolution and the military democratization that began with it, the citizen-soldier, even if still mostly male, has become commonplace because modern nation-states have adopted the principle that citizens owe military service to their country and can even be compulsorily recruited to serve in its armies, adding to its unification through the control of violence and the mobilization of the population within its territory. The modern theorization of the citizen-soldier, though, began prior to the French Revolution, most probably, as R. Claire Snyder (1999) suggests, with Machiavelli. According to Snyder, Machiavelli offers the figure of the citizen-soldier who is an active participant in a civic militia as a cornerstone of civic republicanism. The citizen-soldier's active military service, while presupposing a certain level of commitment to a common good believed to be embodied in the republic, teaches one how to act in concert with others for the common good that is the republic, therefore, how to act responsibly as a political participant. Snyder adds that for Machiavelli, when active soldiering and citizenship were co-molded, in as much as the learning of military skills and competences requires not only the containment and repression but also the conquest and destruction of the feminine, as a male becomes a soldier and citizen, he also becomes masculine. If his masculinization is unsuccessful, if he remains in some sense effeminate, he can be neither a good-enough soldier nor a good-enough citizen.

To assure the successfully interwoven formation of the masculine citizen-soldier, Machiavelli argued for continuous active military service. On the one hand, Snyder claims that this is a reasonable requirement in light of Machiavelli's assumption that masculine citizen-soldiers have to be produced. On the other hand, this amounts to a militarization of life whose excess produces not civic republican virtues but rather a set of vices; thus, for example, exclusionary
chauvinism supplants republican patriotism and obedient conformism replaces selfless service to the republic. The citizen-soldier, then, cannot be counted on merely by virtue of being a citizen-soldier, when it comes to republican politics, and by extension, I would say agonal democratic politics of the kind Arendt envisions. In some people, military service will produce important political virtues. In others, it will produce appalling political vices.

**War, Inclusion, and Militarization**

I use the term *people* above because I think that with the advent of gender equality and the increase of active military service by women one has to begin thinking in more inclusive terms about the subjectifying effects of soldiering. Women constitute about 15 percent of today’s U.S. and other professional Western militaries, as well as various quasi-military groups, such as insurgents and terrorists, and the numbers of women serving in armed forces of all kinds in both combat and support roles is only likely to increase. But, women-soldiers are not the only women exposed to the military and to militaristic values and thus they are not the only women who may end up with political virtues or political vices as a result of this exposure.

Concerned with the vices that militarization produces and understanding militarization as involving additional vices to exclusionary chauvinism and obedient conformism, such as a disposition to perceive the world as dangerous and the danger as best contained by force, Cynthia Enloe (2000, 2007) has traced the infiltration and diffusion of militarization at the global level. Enloe suggests that it is not merely military service that militarizes. Military families, for example, always with some exceptions, tend to be militarized, as are, also with exceptions, workers at any level in companies that have the lion’s share of their country’s and other defense contracts like U.S.–based Lockheed Martin, Israel-based Elbit Systems, or Swedish-based Saab. Many government workers are militarized, as are a fair number of college and university professors, especially in disciplines deemed important by the state, and there are many others, some not even because their jobs bring them into situations in which they have to deal with actual militaries and decisions that affect them but because they are ideologically committed to militarism. Given the reach of militarization and given advances in gender equality, Enloe believes that more women than ever before are now exposed to militarization and adapt to militarism, thereby partaking in the vices of exclusionary chauvinism and obedient conformism and sharing the disposition to perceive the world as dangerous and the danger as best contained by force.

Enloe notes that women’s adaptation to militarism is not necessarily a form of masculinization. Indeed, according to her, militarism depends on feminized women who serve as both the ideal caretakers of warriors and the subject of
their protection. In times of war, particularly the types of wars we are seeing today that Mary Kaldor (1998) calls “new wars,” it may seem as if the whole idea of protection is inoperative. According to Kaldor, new wars are different from “old wars” in that they are not governed by modern binaries and thus, for example, do not respect distinctions such as the one between “combatants” or, more generally, soldiers and “civilians.” Kaldor uses the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992–1995) as her example of a new war. In this war, according to Kaldor, civilians were the primary targets of violence, both overtly militaristic violence, such as indiscriminate shelling of cities and towns or sniping, and the more insidious forms of violence that occurred in the process of ethnic cleansing. Although Kaldor is aware that women were victimized by several kinds of rape during the war, including rape as a kind of torture and in “rape camps,” and even comments rape as a tactic deployed in the process of ethnic cleansing, she does not make strong gender distinctions while describing and analyzing the violence inflicted on civilians during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. For her, rape is among the atrocities committed during the war and as such, similar to others, such as torture of men and boys, imprisonment in concentration camps, enslavement, mass murder, and the genocidal massacres experienced by all.

And yet, as Charli Carpenter (2006) demonstrates, gender makes a difference and did so even in Bosnia-Herzegovina. For her, too, the rapes that occurred during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina were one kind of atrocity among the many committed during the war. Some of the attention they received is, according to her, gender biased and complicit in the suffering of men and boys, which gender norms augment, an assertion that Carpenter supports with empirical observations that show how the protection of civilians is made normal by assumptions about gender (and age) and with extremely high costs for men (and older boys), whose status as civilians deserving of protection is elided via the operation of these assumptions. Using the conduct of the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina as one of her examples, Carpenter notes how after the fall of a Bosnian town, the BSA typically let many Bosnian women, children, and men older than sixty flee or alternatively deported them, sometimes raped younger women or moved them to rape camps, and killed most older boys and men younger than sixty, all the while claiming to act within the limits set by international law for the protection of civilians.

The BSA’s claims should not be merely indexed to ignorance of international law or taken as necessarily hypocritical. What the BSA claims indicate is the mapping of the terms civilians and women or perhaps women and children (and maybe some older men) onto each other, as Carpenter points out. She also calls attention to how this mapping was not merely peculiar to the BSA but coheres with contemporary practices of NGOs and even the UN.

The mapping of the terms civilians and women (and children and older men) onto each other is the result of a specific historical development of constraints
on the ways wars are fought. The Western doctrine of “just war,” which provides the basis for current treaty-based international constraints on both engagement in and conduct of war, has some of its origins in Medieval chivalry, which required knights to extend courtesy to women and children, and the weak more generally, including their gallant protection. Christian legal thinkers reworked the code of chivalry, and by the fourteenth century, incorporated fully into Christian formulations of the just war doctrine jus in bello principle of noncombatant immunity (Johnson, 1981).

When women are mapped onto civilians in the context of discourses on war, they are feminized in particular ways. A femininity of this sort, Wollstonecraft suggested, shares specific political vices with soldiering. According to Wollstonecraft, “A standing army . . . is incompatible with freedom; because subordination and rigour are the . . . sinews of military discipline,” and is therefore “highly injurious to morality” (1792/1967, 45). In addition, she believed that a standing army due to its hierarchical structure, so similar to the one maintained between men and women, effeminates soldiers. She claimed that “standing armies can never consist of resolute robust men; they may be well disciplined machines, but they will seldom contain men under the influence of strong passions, or very vigorous faculties,” all in all, “any depth of understanding . . . is as rarely to be found in the army as amongst women” and “soldiers, as well as women, practice the minor virtues with punctilious politeness” (55).

Politics Against/For War?

Wollstonecraft’s analogies between soldiering and feminization undermine the use of gender identity as an anchor of an alternative to militarism. Jean Bethke Elshtain (1987) has pushed this point further. Concerned about citizenship, specifically its articulation into political practices, even as she shows that many women do not live up to the feminine type, she brings out the problematic aspects of branding women “beautiful souls,” as they have been traditionally, and doing so in order to position them as the warrior’s or combatant’s other. “Beautiful souls” are, of course, pacifists, and as such, according to Elshtain, they are excluded (or exclude themselves) from a meaningful form of politics, which Elshtain believes ought to be multivocal, involving many different identities that are not mapped onto two genders and existing “beyond war and peace” (1987, 257). Elshtain is suspicious of peace no less than war because the two are discursively entwined in a binary that constitutes them always in some kind of opposition to each other, replicating and reinscribing the masculine and feminine alike as related categories.

By positioning politics “beyond war and peace,” Elshtain brings to light an aspect of the Greek ideal of the polity that otherwise easily escapes attention. Though they construed the polity in such a way so that war and other forms of
violence became external to politics, and though they valued peace, the Greeks did not commit themselves to pacifism. When Plato developed his vision of a “barrack community,” his argument presupposed the contingent yet inevitable possibility of war, which together with his assumptions about natural inclinations and the importance of correlating them with a proper division of labor, allowed him to claim that there was a need not merely for spirited soldiers to be entrusted with the defense of the Republic but also for their philosophizing superior officers, the guardians, who were needed to keep them in check.

Keeping spirited soldiers in check requires the guardians to be able to determine when it is just to engage in a war as well as the justice of the conduct of a war. In order to produce these determinations, the guardians need an idea of just war, and Plato sketched just such an idea (for example, Republic V 464e–465b, 469, 470e–471b). For Elshtain, too, the idea of just war is important. While she is critical of a simplified and idealized version of the “just warrior,” in the same way that she is critical of the simplified and idealized version of the “beautiful soul,” she expects citizens—female or male—who practice politics “beyond war and peace” to be able, when necessary, to partake in deliberations about engagement in war and the conduct of the war in just war doctrinal terms. Elshtain herself has been acting as a citizen and writing not only as an academic for other academics, though nonetheless as an expert, but also about the justice of the U.S. wars in Iraq and its “war on terror” (1992, 2003, 2006). Her argument assumes that the just war doctrine, which she thinks can be articulated as a set of clear-enough principles, while perhaps not universal, is, nonetheless, consensually agreed on across multiple cultural traditions and therefore can be validly used to make normative sense of any war. Disagreements between people who use the just war doctrine, such as between herself and many of those criticizing her support of the second Iraq war and aspects of her argument in support of the “war on terror,” exemplify for Elshtain democracy in action.

What for Elshtain is a democratic practice, is, from the point of view of Hardt and Negri (2000, 2004), actually a contribution to a kind of a renaissance of just war doctrine to which scholarly work on just war doctrine also contributes. Hardt and Negri offer a symptomatic reading of the renewed interest in the concept and effectiveness of the just war doctrine. Dating the just war doctrine renaissance to the First Gulf War in 1991, Hardt and Negri argue that a right to intervention has become the key idea of the most recent understandings of the ethical grounds of a just war. This has redefined jus ad bellum (or the justice of war), which traditionally was understood in political terms, hence in the idiom of the defense of a polity’s integrity. The right to intervention has become the key idea of the most recent understandings of the ethical grounds of a just war. This has redefined jus ad bellum (or the justice of war), which traditionally was understood in political terms, hence in the idiom of the defense of a polity’s integrity. The right to intervention is, Hardt and Negri note, the right of dominant subjects to intervene in other subjects’ territories in the interest of preventing or resolving humanitarian problems, guaranteeing accords, or maintaining the peace. Hardt and Negri believe that this indicates a change in the view of the military, now functioning more like the police, even if
still confined to action at the borders of empire because the distinction between the “domestic” and the “global” has yet to be fully erased.

Hardt and Negri’s idea of empire is rather unique. They do not mean a territorially based political unit that is expanding its dominion forcefully via conquest or with its aid as far as it can reach. Rather, Hardt and Negri describe empire as a postmodern, emergent global form of sovereignty, distinct from specific states or transnational organizations, although composed of them and uniting them under a single logic of rule. This postmodern empire is as expansionist as all previous empires. What it expands is its rule and the order that is constituted by it, and this expansion depends on the empire’s ability to project law and order ever further. At the same time, the empire’s ability to coerce through force is represented and appears as merely a necessary means for conflict resolution and the establishment of a civil, organized, and tidy, yet fluid and changing, world society.

This last characteristic clarifies why the military functions like the police in an empire. From empire’s perspective, there are no outside nations and therefore no possibility for state-against-state war. There are conflicts, even violent conflicts, but they are internal, and to deal with such conflicts is police work. Therefore, the sovereign has the right to intervene, which authorizes police action when there is an appropriate conflict. No right to intervention was accorded to the sovereign nation-states that formed the modern state system. They had a right to war triggered by aggression directed at them or their allies. A weak right to intervention came into being after World War II with the formation of the United Nations, which, according to its charter, commits its members both to this weak right to intervention and to state sovereignty. For Hardt and Negri, this was only a step. By now, it is not that the balance has tilted toward a weak sovereignty and a strong right to intervention. Sovereignty is as strong as ever, maybe even stronger. It just does not belong to states, or belongs to them only as an emaciated semblance since states do not have a right to intervention.

The imperial version of sovereignty and the right to intervention that it implies have been strengthened since the Al Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001, according to Hardt and Negri. This, they suggest, is a function of another phase in the changes of war, still fought by state militaries even as they operate like police forces, which since the September 11 attacks and because of the U.S. declaration of and engagement in a “war on terror,” has become a “permanent social relation” (2004, 12). The expansion of militarism that Enloe analyzes so carefully is but a symptom of war, which is becoming the matrix of daily life in empire even when the actual fighting takes place in faraway places like Iraq or Afghanistan.

Hardt and Negri’s position is problematic on many grounds. Still, I find their analysis to be both insightfully intriguing and very troubling.
Troubling because it seems to leave no viable criteria for assessing war or any kind of organized violence, especially when the violence is wielded by militaries, police forces, peacekeeping forces, and the like. This is so because their criticism of the right to intervention cuts even against nonpacifist cosmopolitan alternatives to the just war doctrine. Such an alternative is, for example, hinted at by Kaldor, who believes that the just war doctrine cannot be stretched and remolded to make normative sense of “new wars” and advocates the construction of international peacekeeping forces that will function like a police force. But a move in this direction will transform all conflicts into internal conflicts and will enshrine a right to intervention in support of a particular kind of world order, most probably a descendent version of liberalism.\textsuperscript{14}

There are, however, forms of organized violence that Hardt and Negri appear to interpret positively because they are decentralized resistant forms, which are part of the networks that make up the grass roots based opposition to empire that is developing inside empire. The positive interpretation that Hardt and Negri offer turns self-defense and self-determination into causi belli—literally, cause for war—but in Hardt and Negri’s version, justifiable grounds for organized violent engagements.

Desiring Politics

One could read Hardt and Negri as contradicting themselves. I think, though, that what their, as well as Elshtain’s (and Kaldor’s and Enloe’s and others’) arguments reveal is a desire for a normative differentiation of violence into distinct enough kinds. The pacifist has no such desire. For the pacifist, the term violence is morally loaded in a manner that allows for no distinctions.\textsuperscript{15} Violence is always bad and violent actions are always wrong. Accordingly, the only appropriate pacifist desire with respect to violence and violent acts is for their abolition. For the realist, violence is not unitary. But, for the realist, normativity is a function of efficacy alone. No further criteria are needed so none needs to be desired. If one is neither a pacifist nor a realist, one cannot but desire a normative differentiation of violence into kinds.

I am repeating a phrase that I borrow from Gayatri Spivak, who refers to liberalism and other modernist emancipatory projects as “that which we cannot not want” (1993, 44). According to Wendy Brown (2000), Spivak’s phrase captures her sense of limits on a historically specific political imagination, namely the political imagination possible in the present to those struggling for a more just world. I apply Spivak’s phrase to the idea of a normative differentiation of violence into distinct enough kinds—in particular, distinct enough kinds of collective violence—in an attempt to capture my sense of similar historically specific constraints on the political imagination.
The political imagination is always configured historically, and in this respect, it is necessarily determined. And yet, because it is a kind of imagination and therefore can “make present” something that is absent without necessarily re-presenting it as a memory of something, the political imagination is the condition of possibility of political desires. These come in ideal and non-ideal versions, both of which aim beyond the present at some normative horizon like justice. I think that the desire for a normative differentiation of violence into kinds is a non-ideal political desire since it presupposes the continued presence and efficacy of violence. The normative horizon of this desire has been traditionally construed as justice, hence the traditional language of “just war,” and similarly, the search for fairness in the application of police force. It has also traditionally been construed in terms of ethics or morality, hence the traditional understanding of a “just war” as morally justifiable or at least morally acceptable, and similarly, the understanding of the application of police force as morally justifiable or at least acceptable (or not).

I am concerned that the traditional interpretation, due to its emphasis on the moral, undermines that which is political about the non-ideal desire for a normative differentiation of violence into kinds. I suspect that the emphasis on the moral is a function of the historical development of ideas about war and violence, most of which took place in ethics or law, and in the West, was carried out primarily by Christian theologians like Saint Augustine of Hippo and Saint Thomas Aquinas, at least until the rise of modernity and formation of the Westphalian state system. It is actually quite interesting to read Plato’s writing on war because his worries, as was fitting a member of a Greek polity and especially Athens, were much different from ours. In accordance, the Socrates of the Republic draws distinctions between a violence that the Greeks deploy against each other and wars with other people, such as the Persians, and expects the conflicts giving rise to them to be resolved quite differently in the final analysis because the Greeks can talk with each other but not with the barbarians.

For the Greeks to fight justly against each other meant not destroying the conditions of the possibility of talking with each other and, therefore, preserving the most basic conditions of the possibility of politics and especially some version of democratic politics. When they did not live up to their own precepts, they committed atrocities, as in the case of Athens’ destruction of Melos in 416 BCE. Still, and perhaps also in light of this, if justice as the normative horizon of a non-ideal desire for a normative differentiation among kinds of violence is to frame this desire politically, then what Greeks concerns hint at is that in the case of violence justice is first and foremost about how politics is conceived and what makes politics possible. I think of politics agonally and democratically, and so have come to appreciate the Greek commitment to the preservation of the conditions that make talk possible.
This essay brings together ideas that I presented at several conferences and at various invited talks. I am grateful for the many comments I received at these presentations. I also thank Lisa Tessman for reading and commenting on drafts and listening to me as I worked my way through this essay.

1. Howard argues that Clausewitz prioritized politics over war and that scholars usually disregard this interpretation. Howard does not discuss or analyze what “politics” and “policy” meant for Clausewitz who defined war as “an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will,” and stated that “attached to force are certain self-imposed, imperceptible limitations hardly worth mentioning, known as international law and custom, but they scarcely weaken it” (1984, 75).

2. This paradoxical tension reappears in the founding texts of liberalism, although it must be understood in light of the new conditions under which it is now being reworked and restaged. For an example of current discussions, see Mouffe 2000.

3. Hartsock initially offered these ideas in 1982, and then further developed them in her 1983 book. Some of Hartsock’s contentions are supported by the work of Arlene W. Saxonhouse (1985). However, Saxonhouse understands Plato as conceiving women as similarly alienated from the polis and attempting to include them. There is textual support for both of these feminist interpretations of Plato.

4. The levee en masse was proclaimed in 1793. William McNeill (1982) argues that its success was a function of population growth preceding the French Revolution and bad and worsening economic conditions as well as standardization under Napoleon. Independently of the causes of its success, success led to widespread adoption and to a presumption in favor of conscription, which is assumed to be an option even in states that have volunteer professional armies.

5. Reardon (1986) argues that exclusionary chauvinism and obedient conformism are not products of militarization per se but a function of the sexism that underlines most known societies. They merely take on certain modalities when a society is militarized because the military, just as Machiavelli wanted, overemphasizes and exaggerates the masculine. Reardon-like interpretations have not always acknowledged precedence in Wollstonecraft’s 1792 work, which was published during the same time that the French revolutionaries were beginning to move toward a universal draft.

6. Examples of this abound, but I tend to cull mine from the Israeli experience. See, for example, Segev 2007.

7. There are a few countries like Israel that mandate service in their armed forces for men and women alike, although even in such countries men and women tend to serve in different capacities. Most countries that conscript do so only in the case of men. van Creveld (2001) argues that the changing nature of war is likely to have an adverse influence on women’s participation in militaries. But even if he is right about women staying out of combat, it does not mean that more women cannot enter support roles.

8. I am reluctant to name disciplines. The pressure on the sciences and engineering is, of course, especially acute (see Enloe 2007, 160). Militarism as ideology can be quite seductive. See Bacevich’s (2005) analysis of its current hold on the United States.
9. Kaldor is not alone in arguing that war has been transformed or is undergoing a transformation. The RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs) project, undertaken by many regular militaries, including that of the United States, is a response to multiple studies that have suggested that present and future wars are and will be qualitatively different from the wars of modernity. RMA, however, is taking shape more in response to studies like those of Martin Van Creveld (1991), who argues that since 1945 most wars have been fought as series of skirmishes, bombings, and massacres and that one can expect the same into the future. Militaries that do not adjust will continue to lose just as the United States did in Vietnam. Kaldor agrees with Van Creveld about the specifics, but makes further connections between new forms of fighting wars and globalization. The result is that she does not advocate mere military adaptations to new strategic situations.

10. It is important to note that Wollstonecraft’s observations about the similarity between feminine women and soldiers stand at an important variance from the common feminist observations, which tend to bifurcate the two. I am not discussing this variance but rather using both kinds of observations.

11. Hardt and Negri have received criticism primarily for their deterritorialized conception of empire that misrepresents the role of the United States in the world system (see, for example Harvey 2003). A few critics have also brought up their gender bias (for example, Hawkesworth 2006). The critics’ points are, I believe, well taken.

12. There are different kinds of cosmopolitanism. However, most current versions, even when advanced by egalitarians, tend to liberalism (see Habermas 1998, 2001; Held 1996; and Rawls 1999).

13. Some pacifists resist absolutism and draw distinctions. The one distinction that I find easy to adopt is between war-pacifism and a full-fledged commitment to nonviolence in all realms of life. For an attempt to define pacifism both widely and inclusively, see Cady 1984.


15. This developmental trajectory has its equivalences in Islam and Judaism, though the timelines for each culture on which they exert their influences into modernity are different from the Western one.

References


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