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Your TA's name:

## SUNY-Binghamton Economics 160, Principles of Microeconomics, Christopher Manes Problem set 8 Game Theory

This problem set is some examples of $2 \times 2$ games.

1) Players: ruling class in China ruling class in Japan

Each country is controlled by businessmen in import-competing industries. Tariffs can make these businessmen better off (even though they reduce total surplus).
Strategies: tariffs free trade
Outcomes: producer surplus for each ruling class.

a) What is dominant strategy for

China? $\qquad$ (free trade or tariffs) Japan? $\qquad$ (free trade or tariffs)
b) Which boxes are Nash equilibria? $\qquad$ (1, 2,3 , or 4 , or some combination)
2) Players: two companies, Coca-cola (or as we say in Atlanta, Co-cola) and Pepsi. Each company must choose the size of its advertising budget. Strategies: high budget low budget Outcomes: profit for each company.

Coke

Pepsi

Which boxes are Nash equilibria? $\qquad$ (1, 2,3 , or 4 , or some combination)
3) Players: you and a classmate who have been assigned a group project. It is the night before the project is due. Each of you must decide whether to work on the project, or party.
Strategies: work party
Outcomes: Each of you wants to maximize his or her own happiness. If you both work, you both get an A. If you ooh party, you both get a D. If one parties and the other works, you both get a B. Partying increases happiness by $: 5$ units. Studying per se adds zero units to happiness. Happiness is also affected by your grade. An A gives 40 units of happiness to each of you; a B gives 30 units happiness to each; a D gives 10 units of happiness. Fill out he table below with total happiness for each of you.

## Party <br> Classmate

Yon


Which boxes are Nash equilibria? $\qquad$ (1,2,3 or 4 , or some combination)

1) Players: two companies IBM Rand. These two firms produce identical mainframe computers.

Strategies: charge high price charge low price
Outcomes: profit for each company
IBM

(1) or (4)
a) Which outcome is best for the firms' shareholders? $\qquad$ (1, or 4
b) Which boxes are Nash equilibria? $\qquad$ (1,2,3 or 4 , or some combination)

