Acemogly\& Rovirson," Political loseks"

Puzelc:
sometimes efficiency-enhancing reform
(newtechnology, a bolition of monopoly,
free traje...)
is blockel by pulitically powerful grangs who get rent from oid system.
$B_{n}$ t saciety showld lec a ble to a Jopt reform \& compeusate blockers, learing them at least os mueh as thiy got urlev oll system, Example monopoly


Kents under monevely: $A+B$
What somebody is willing to kany to a halish monepoly: $A+B+C$
$A \& U(\operatorname{con} x$.
proposed answer

1) If blockers take the deal, they may lose promised compensation if they lose political power
2) "political power is dependent on the monopolist's [blocker's] economic position in that, when it blocks the [reform], it is more likely to remain in power."

Across countries, better development outcomes where elites feel more secure in power.

