Choosing to Intervene: Outside Interventions into
Internal Conflicts as a Policy Choice


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The purpose of this article is to evaluate the conditions under which third parties will intervene in ongoing intrastate conflicts. Intervening in civil conflicts is a risky business, even though the frequency with which outside actors do so may mask the extent of the risk. Understanding the conditions under which outside actors will intervene in intrastate conflicts is central to our ability to evaluate the effectiveness of past interventions. The dominant paradigm in world politics -- realism -- would suggest that interventions only take place when clear national interests are at stake (Morgenthau 1967; Bull 1984; Feste 1993). Contrasting models, however, posit that ethical issues and domestic politics can play a leading role in the decision to intervene (Blechman 1995; Dowty and Louscher 1996; Carment and James 1995). Furthermore, the relatively recent cascade of prescriptive advice suggests that there is a pressing need for a systematic analysis of the conditions that lead to interventions as well as the subsequent effectiveness of any intervention policy (e.g. Dorman and Ott 1995; Kanter and Brooks 1994; Smith 1994; Solarz 1986).

Examples abound, such as France's decision to intervene in Rwanda at the later stages of the genocidal slaughter of the Tutsi in 1994, which epitomize the tenuous nature of unilateral intervention decisions. The United States' intervention against the Sandinista government of Nicaragua was also rife with domestic and international political considerations. At the international level the US had to endure condemnation and a legal defeat at the World Court, while domestic opposition led to Congressional curtailment of funding and ultimately the basement operations of Oliver North. But probably the most vexing example contrasts the conflict in the former Yugoslavia to that of the newly independent Bosnia-Herzegovina. Essentially nobody intervened as Yugoslavia broke up, but once conflict broke out in the independent state of Bosnia nearly everybody intervened.

First I develop a brief background of what we know about the motivations behind interventions and articulate a decision theoretic model that would account for the conditions under which states will intervene. Next I discuss definitions and operational criteria necessary for an empirical test. I then present the analysis and a discussion of the inferences we might draw from the results.

**Interventions in the Literature and a Decision Framework**
The study of outside interventions into internal conflicts has both a long and a distorted history. The problems are generally threefold 1) interventions were generally conceived of in solely military terms when in the modern world this is clearly insufficient (e.g. Huffbauer and Schott 1983); 2) very little research focuses exclusively on intrastate conflicts, which presents a unique and growing concern (e.g. Carment 1993; Regan 1996; Licklider 1993 & 1995; Hampson 1996); and 3) there is little systematic evidence to support many of the prescriptive arguments put forth (e.g. Kaufmann 1996). Rosenau (1968, 1969) began to disentangle some of the conceptual issues related to interventions, positing two criteria by which we can discriminate between intervention and influence. An intervention, he argued, required: 1) convention-breaking and 2) authority-targeted policies. The logic behind intervention remained rooted in realism, as reflected in the work of Morgenthau (1967), Bull (1984), and Feste (1993). Mitchell (1970) developed a "transnational theory" of interventions, positing that there were two types of linkages that increase the likelihood of interventions, transactional and affective. The former involves economic, military, educational and political linkages between political or social groups in an intervener and target country; the latter consists of ideological, religious and ethnic ties between groups. Mitchell furthermore argued that there are four factors that influence interventions 1) characteristics of the country in conflict, 2) characteristics of the intervener, 3) linkage patterns between the groups in the target and intervener, and 4) the character of the international system.

In a series of studies Pearson (1974; with Baumann 1993; and with Baumann and Pickering 1994) has identified a number of factors associated with third party military interventions, ranging from the level of conflict to geography and geopolitics. In his first study he showed that there was a slightly higher propensity for states to intervene when the level of internal unrest was high (1974); by the latter study (1994) he was relating interventions to the size and the motives of the intervener. Tillema (1989, 1991) has generated one of the more comprehensive data sets on military interventions and examined the role of superpower politics in military interventions, but his notion of an intervention is restricted to overt military means and includes both inter- and intra-state conflicts, somewhat confounding inferences we might draw for this study. Regan (1996) identified some of the conditions conducive to successful interventions in intrastate conflicts, but acknowledges a selection bias in his cases resulting from sampling on instances of intervention.
Carment and James (1995; and with Rowlands 1995) posit that the decision to intervene in civil conflicts can be heavily influenced by the ethnic affinities between the potential intervener and the target, where the greater the cross-boundary affinities, inter alia, the more likely we will see interventions. This argument is consistent with the "affective linkages" propositions articulated by Mitchell twenty five years earlier. Scott (1996) argues that the decision to intervene is a result of doctrinal policies and bureaucratic infighting, with the implicit operative factor being the Cold War politics between the US and the USSR. His analysis is restricted to US policy under the Reagan doctrine. Blechman (1995) advances an argument that the moral imperative to intervene accounts for interventions into civil unrest. Humanitarian crises epitomized by famines and refugee flows compel members of the world community to do something. Dowty and Louscher (1996) take the notion of refugee flows and argue that they can impose costs that affect the national interests and therefore interventions in conflicts with large refugee flows are justified by international convention. Through all of this research, however, we do not have a set of logically consistent and empirically verified conditions that increase the likelihood that outside actors will intervene in internal conflicts.

**Which States Choose to Intervene and Why**

The question of when and which states consider interventions is a tricky one to answer empirically because we generally do not know which ones considered intervening but chose not to. This selection bias problem is a common one to deterrence studies (see Huth 1988; with Russett 1984) and has been discussed by Fearon (1994), Gartner and Siverson (1996), and Regan (1996). I will articulate a decision theoretic model from which predictions about the types of conflicts that attract outside interventions will be tested. Intervention is defined as convention breaking military and/or economic activities in the internal affairs of a foreign country targeted at the authority structures of the government with the aim of affecting the balance of power between the government and opposition forces. This definition closely mirrors that developed by Rosenau (1968, 1969) and modified by Feste (1993). Diplomatic forms of intervention are excluded from the analysis, as are multilateral intervention efforts. These two exclusions deserve some elaboration.
Diplomatic interventions, such as the role of outside mediators, have been excluded in part because they have already received a considerable amount of empirical attention, even if the focus has not always been specifically targeted at internal conflicts (see Bercovitch 1989; Bercovitch and Langely 1993; Hampson 1995; Kleiboer 1996). But more importantly, diplomatic efforts do not require the same level of political risk encountered by the more visible and costly military or economic interventions. The relatively low level of cost associated with attempting to diplomatically settle a conflict leads to a different decision calculus and a different set of criteria for determining when to intervene. Furthermore, diplomatic interventions are generally targeted at solidifying the status quo, whereas other forms of intervention often attempt to alter the conditions on the ground. US deliberations over policies toward the Bosnian civil war reflect this difference between diplomatic and other forms of intervention. Needless to say, some of the characteristics of a conflict associated with successful military and/or economic interventions are probably similar to those associated with success at the diplomatic table, though this remains an empirical question that can be addressed through further research. The exclusion of multilateral interventions from this analysis is also predicated on the nature of the decision faced by political leaders. Because of the way cost and benefits from outside interventions are distributed when the policy is carried out under the auspices of a collective group, state level decisions are less encumbered by the political costs related to the intervention and its possible failure. The magnitude of the contribution to this collective effort obviously varies across actors, but the ability to distribute the costs -- at least the political costs -- makes the decision criteria somewhat different from those associated with unilateral interventions. The anticipated time frame, the breadth of the mission, and its timing also seem to vary extensively between unilateral and multilateral interventions, affecting, as they would, the expected costs of an intervention. The conditions under which multilateral interventions are most likely has been taken up by the author under a different banner (Regan, 1997).

States may self-select themselves out of potential interventions for numerous reasons related to both domestic and international considerations, but primarily we would not expect a political leader to intervene in a conflict in which she or he expected the policy to fail. In such instances we would anticipate that the decision maker would adopt an alternative policy. Broadly speaking I assume that there are three conditions that must be met before the political leadership would undertake an intervention policy 1) there
is a reasonable expectation for success, 2) the projected time horizon for achieving the outcome is short, and 3) that there is domestic support for the policy (see Kanter and Brooks 1994; Daalder 1996; Vertzberger 1993). First, if success is unlikely, there would be few payoffs from a failed intervention. Second, the longer the time horizon the greater the ratio of costs to benefits. As the intervention draws out material costs generally increase while potential benefits would generally remain constant or possibly decline. And finally, lack of domestic support would increase the domestic audience costs without increasing potential benefits. This is consistent with Mitchell's (1970) notion of affective linkages and Carment and James' (1995) argument about the role of ethnic affinities. I also assume that a potential intervening state gets no utility from an intervention itself, that is, states do not intervene simply to intervene.

The practical implications of these assumptions can be seen in the public discourse during the US deliberations over intervening in Haiti, Zaire, Rwanda, and Bosnia, to name a few cases. In each instance the effect of the policy in Somalia (1991-93) can be readily felt. In Haiti and Bosnia clear deadlines for exiting were established before the intervention went forward, and the deadline was short relative to the magnitude of the problems the interventions sought to address. In the debates over whether to participate in a Canadian-led effort to assist refugees in the Zairian conflict in late 1996, one of the key criterion guiding US decision makers was the short-term nature of the planned intervention. The role played by subjective estimates of success is also evident in these cases. Rwanda appeared to pose insurmountable problems and in spite of the magnitude of the slaughter, the US leadership overcame its humanitarian impulse and decided against intervention. The recent tragedy in Somalia loomed large (Adelman and Suhkri 1996). In Haiti and Bosnia the need to have a high probability of success translated into the design of intervention policies that employed massive uses of force. The role of time, the likelihood of success, and public support are not confined to military interventions, though they do seem to weigh more heavily when troops are involved. Economic sanctions against one of the combatants must also be subject to political scrutiny. The perception that economic sanctions are rarely effective -- or that they take too long to achieve results -- influences the willingness to impose sanctions.

The source of the costs and benefits of intervention policies generally break along two lines, domestic and international. Domestic cost and benefits can be conceived of in terms of their political
ramifications, or audience costs (Fearon 1994). Certainly there are human and material costs to an intervention, but from the decision makers' point of view these are often translated into political considerations. International costs and benefits, on the other hand, generally accrue under the banner of national security, yet also consist of material and audience costs. Successful interventions will generally maximize political benefits while minimizing political costs; failure would tend to do the opposite.

The political, the material, and the human costs of intervention are intertwined, with the link tied to the political arena in which the decisions are made. The broad parameters of these costs and benefits, furthermore, are such that decision makers must be cognizant of them while grappling with the conflicting advice, divided allegiances, and bureaucratic inertia characteristic of any complex decision. Equally important is the notion that the extent of costs and benefits associated with any particular policy regarding intervention would be intimately linked to the success or failure of that intervention policy. For example, if there were two identical interventions -- in terms of human and material costs -- and one succeeded and the other failed, we would expect the political costs of the failed intervention to surpass those associated with the successful policy.

With this background of how the environment structures the costs and benefits of an intervention policy, I will develop a model of the conditions under which a political leader will be increasingly likely to choose to intervene. My use of a decision theoretic model comes with a note of clarification. We use models in many ways in the social sciences, sometimes to formally deduce testable propositions, and at times to frame our thinking about how events unfold and to look for plausible causal connections. I am positing that to understand the choice that determines which conflicts will attract interventions it is helpful to think in terms of decision making patterns and criteria. As such I propose a decision theoretic framework that is useful for forcing us to think about those factors that are probably central to the decision making process. But my model serves most effectively as a heuristic device that compells us to come to grips with these struggles faced by the decision maker. The formalization only makes the argument more transparent, it is not a necessary contribution to the dialog. As with any dialog in the social sciences, in order to increase our understanding of the selection criteria that results in interventions others will have to push these frontiers further by challenging or building on what we know.
Satisfying the Conditions for Intervention

I make the assumption that the decision to intervene is a result of internal processes in the intervening country. Events in the target country affect an intervention decision through the impact on expected outcomes, and the costs and benefits, but the decision over whether or not to intervene results from the internal dynamics in the potential intervener. From a formal perspective I assume that the subjective estimate of the likelihood of a given outcome is exogenous to the relationship between intervener and target (Tsbelis 1990). If this assumption is incorrect, Tsbelis points out, then the inferences from the model may also be incorrect. The assumption is reasonable. When France intervened in Rwanda in 1994 it is unlikely that the potential response of the Hutu leadership greatly influenced their decision. More likely, they considered the situation on the ground and their capabilities before deciding to intervene. I am effectively assuming that France's estimate of the probability of success would not have been determined by the moves and countermoves of the Hutu or Tutsi to France's intervention. Likewise, Nigeria's decision to intervene in Sierra Leone's 1997 conflict was a result of internal processes and Sierra Leone's potential response was not a determining factor in the Nigerian leaderships subjective estimate of 'p'.

In determining the strategy to be taken, the potential intervening country estimates the probability of success and weighs the costs in terms of international reputation, national interests, and domestic constraints against potential benefits that accrue in these realms. I assume that a successful outcome is one in which the intervention contributes to the cessation of hostilities. This is consistent with Regan's (1996) definition of the goal of intervention, is somewhat convergent with Pearson's (1974) notion of interventions targeted at increasing "stability", it adopts the same frame of reference for the end of militarized dispute identified in the Correlates of War data (Bremer, Jones, and Singer 1997), and fits with the first half of Diehl's (1993) two part definition of successful peacekeeping interventions. Clearly not all interventions have the explicit goal of stopping the hostilities, but other conceptions of success considered by potential interveners can often be achieved by stopping the fighting or require this as a necessary first step. It is equally clear that military or economic interventions in civil conflicts cannot be effective at conflict resolution (the second half of Diehl's two-part definition). Decision makers seeking regional or global security would generally prefer that an internal conflict end without them having to expend
resources to achieve that outcome. But they would also prefer to expend some resources if they thought that their efforts could ensure stability, and since states get no utility from the act of intervening, then they would not intervene if they had a low expectation about the role of an intervention in ensuring stability.

The political nature of intervention policies means that there will be audience costs tied to interested constituency groups -- either domestic or international. Decision makers have to weigh the competing demands of various constituencies, who will often be at odds over the preferred policy. The US policy toward Bosnia is a case in point. There were vocal and powerful groups arguing for a minimal involvement, while at the same time there were groups protesting about the lack of a forceful US response and calling on the President to send in troops. In this type of environment the decision maker incurs audience costs, costs for being too timid, too indecisive, or too aggressive. Some of these costs are incurred even when the decision is made not to intervene. As with human and material costs, audience costs are a function of the success of the outcome. The cost function associated with intervention decisions can therefore be expressed as $C_i = \Sigma$ material + $\Sigma$ audience, where $C_i$ reflects the costs of intervening.

The decision to intervene is also a function of the decision makers' subjective estimate of the likely outcome of the conflict, and the role of the intervention in that outcome. Because costs and benefits attributable to the intervention are, in part, related to the success or failure of the intervention policy, the greater the subjective probability of success the greater the expected utility for intervention. The type of intervention strategy affects the costs of intervention, but also the likelihood that a specific policy will be successful. I assume that beliefs about the effect of specific strategies for intervention on the likely outcome of the effort are incorporated into the subjective estimates of the potential success of the intervention, such that the evaluation of the likely outcome of an intervention takes into account the decision makers' beliefs about what works and when. In general, then, the greater the subjective probability that an intervention will lead to a successful outcome, the greater the expected utility to be derived from that intervention.

Conceptually we can think of an intervention decision comprising two separate utility functions, such that the process of determining a policy requires two distinct evaluations. First, the question is posed as to the likely outcome of the conflict without an outside intervention. If the subjective estimate of the probability of a successful settlement is high without an intervention, then the expected utility for not
intervening is high and the decision process stops there without setting in motion the discussion of an
intervention policy. The second stage poses the question of the likely outcome of the conflict in light of an
intervention, but decision makers only address this issue if the expected utility of not intervening is
sufficiently low. If the estimated probability of a successful outcome with an intervention is low -- when
'p' is small -- then the state is unlikely to intervene; when 'p' is high we are more likely to observe
interventions, ceteris paribus. These two conditions can be expressed as

\[ EU_{ni} = q(U_s) + (1-q)(U_c) - \Sigma C_{ni} \]

and

\[ EU_i = p(U_{sw}) + (1-p)(U_f) - \Sigma C_i \]

where \( EU_{ni} \) is the expected utility of not intervening, 'q' is the probability that the conflict will be settled
without outside influence, and \( \Sigma C_{ni} \) are the costs associated with not intervening. The costs, of course, do
not reflect material costs, but rather any audience costs associated with not intervening in a conflict for
which there is a constituency advocating intervention. \( EU_i \) reflects the expected utility from an
intervention, with 'p' representing the decision maker's subjective probability that the intervention will
result in a successful outcome; \( \Sigma C_i \) are the costs associated with the intervention, reflecting human,
material, and audience costs. \( U_s \) reflects the utility to the potential intervener from a successful settlement
without an intervention, \( U_{sw} \) is the utility of success with an intervention, \( U_c \) is the utility of continued
fighting without an intervention, and \( U_f \) is the utility of a continuation of the fighting after an unsuccessful
intervention.²

**Expected Payoffs and the Decision to Intervene**

Given this model three factors can influence the expected utility of intervening: costs, utilities
over outcomes, and estimates of the likelihood of the intervention being successful; all are intertwined. As
the costs increase -- either human, material or audience -- the expected utility for intervention decreases.
Subjective estimates of the likely outcome of the conflict with and without an intervention would also be a
critical variable in the intervention calculus. In the inequalities above if 'q' is high and 'p' is low, then it would be unlikely that we would observe an intervention; conversely, if 'q' is low and 'p' is high, then intervening is more likely the policy of choice.3

The key to understanding when or under what conditions an intervention will be undertaken lies in articulating the circumstances in which a) the benefits of intervening outweigh potential costs, and b) the probability of a settlement with and without an intervention (p and q) are low and high, respectively. The types of factors that would influence a decision maker trying maximize expected utility over a decision about intervening are undoubtedly many and varied, but what we know about the constraints imposed on foreign policy decisionmakers point to a number of critical areas to focus upon.

A clear understanding of how costs and benefits are influenced by characteristics of the conflict, or the system in which it is waged will facilitate the derivation of hypotheses from the expected utility model. For example, we can ask what factors affect the costs of an intervention beyond the material and human aspects of the policy. Audience costs would be one important constraint on policy (Fearon 1994) and are largely a function of domestic politics. As we recently saw in Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, and Zaire, public opinion plays a vital role. Public outcry over failure to take action (Bosnia) influenced the Clinton administration's policy. Likewise a failed policy can lead to quick reversals in light of public disquiet with the policy (e.g. Somalia and Lebanon). Audience costs are in part a function of ethical concerns expressed by the body politic (Kohut and Toth 1995; Blechman 1995). Costs rooted in the loss of security or adverse changes in the strategic environment would also be important in the decision making process. Proponents from either a realpolitik or an idealpolitik perspective would weigh disproportionately the sources of these potential costs.

Benefits -- or the utility derived from an intervention -- are reasonably clear from a realist perspective. Maximizing security (Waltz 1979), increasing power (Morgenthau 1967), or minimizing threats to security (Walt 1987) are the objectives of foreign policy, and an intervention that successfully advances these objectives generally has high utility. Successfully containing a violent conflict and/or stopping or assisting the flow of refugees can also generate political capital for acting in pursuit of ethical objectives. These benefits would be the flip side of audience costs, derived from the support of international or domestic constituencies. France's intervention into Rwanda to stop the genocidal policies
of the Hutu reflect this type of benefit. They gained little by way of national security but recouped some lost international stature as a result of their actions (Adelman and Suhkri 1996).

Articulating the factors that influence the subjective estimate of the likelihood of success is a trickier problem. To some extent the probability of success is related to the strategy for intervening, where a larger military force or a more comprehensive punitive sanction policy would have a greater chance of success than smaller interventions. Vietnam, Somalia, and Afghanistan, however, demonstrate that this is not always the case. In general conflicts that are particularly intense -- in terms of the rate of fatalities -- will pose a more serious challenge to an intervener. The degree of enmity, the emotional investment, and the desire for revenge will reduce the chances that an outside intervention will contribute to the cessation of hostilities. When these conditions prevail the sunk costs by the belligerents are too high and the necessary magnitude of an intervention too large to make for a highly probable successful outcome.

One way to understand the constraints on decisions over intervention is to use the two dominant paradigms in world politics to frame the different costs and benefits associated with various characteristics of the conflict and/or the intervention. A realist or neorealist understanding of world politics, for instance, would point to global and regional geopolitics as the explanation for interventions (Feste 1993). When security is threatened, or when geostrategic interests are at stake, interventions would be increasingly likely. The benefits that accrue from ensuring national security outweigh most costs that would be incurred. By the same token domestic political considerations -- driven largely by humanitarian concerns or ethnic affinities -- would have little influence over the decision of whether and when to intervene. The costs of an intervention, therefore, would largely reflect the material and human costs of the policy, with few costs imposed for not intervening. National security drives the decision (e.g. Feste 1993; Morgenthau 1967; Bull 1984).

From a liberal or idealist perspective factors other than geopolitics will contribute to the expected payoff from an intervention policy. Responding to a humanitarian tragedy may bring international and domestic praise, as could stopping the carnage inflicted on a particular group of people. Domestic opposition to a proposed intervention may also sufficiently affect the expectations about prospective payoffs. The domestic debate in the US regarding the proposed intervention in Bosnia is a case in point. These domestic and ethical motivations behind foreign policy are not of immediate concern to those who
adopt a realpolitik view of the world, but can offer considerable explanatory power when considering the
decision to intervene in civil conflicts (Vertzberger 1993).

The world, however, is not so black and white. Factors attributable to both a realist and liberal
understanding of world politics contribute to foreign policy decisions. In the modern world humanitarian
crises to some extent have an impact felt by the entire global community, and it is reasonable to expect
states to attempt to minimize the social dislocations associated with these crises. Domestic constituencies
may press strongly for such active policies, particularly when the conflict and the resulting carnage may
play out through local news media. At the same time geostrategic interests have considerable influence
over the formation and implementation of foreign policy. The policy with regard to an intervention must
reflect both domestic and security pressures. Others, such as Stam (1996) have demonstrated the critical
role played by domestic and international politics in the formation of national security policy.

An important aspect of understanding the interplay between realist and idealist concerns lies in
articulating and identifying the types of constraints that hold sway under differing foreign policy debates.
Intervening in civil conflicts is but one of them. To a large degree the question of whether realist or idealist
concerns dominate foreign policy debates is an empirical question to which the results of this analysis
should contribute. If the structure of the system acts as a strong constraint on action this should show up in
analysis spanning the Cold War/post-Cold War period. In essence we have a built in quasi-experiment
(Campbell and Stanely 1966) with the abrupt change in geostrategic concerns resulting from the end of the
Cold War.

If we evaluate the components of the expected utility model in terms of realists and idealist
considerations at least four specific hypotheses can be derived that reflect expectations consistent with a
realpolitik and idealpolitik understanding of world politics. For example, national security is threatened by
internal unrest in neighboring countries; responding to that threat would be one expectation of a bordering
country. The Soviet policy toward Afghanistan is consistent with this form of national security threat. The
zero-sum nature of the Cold War would also suggest that intervening in internal conflicts during that
period would provide a greater expected payoff than a similar policy in post-Cold War environment.
Supporting one side of an internal conflict (or not supporting) during the Cold War could have a perceived
influence on the strategic balance between Cold War adversaries, resulting in an unacceptable decline in
national security. This strategic calculation would be much less pronounced in the Cold War's aftermath. During the Cold War victory and defeat of "allies" or "opponents" was often a dichotomous outcome, regardless of how extensive the carnage. In the post-Cold War era, where ideological and bloc politics matter less, strategic considerations will be given less weight in the decision over intervention.

Generally speaking, from a realpolitik perspective, specific characteristics of the international system structure will tend to determine the outcome of foreign policy debates. From a non-realist perspective, however, we would expect domestic politics to play a more central role in the making of foreign policy. Humanitarian emergencies associated with civil conflicts could lead to a sense of moral outrage on the part of a domestic audience, who would then exert pressure for their government to take action (Blechman 1995; Kohut and Toth 1995). When conflicts result in large numbers of casualties, or lead to large social dislocations we would expect third parties to face increased pressure from domestic constituencies to take some form of remedial action, even if there is no apparent geopolitical interest. In a broad sense the role of shared borders with a conflicting country, and the ideological chasm of the Cold War -- factors consistent with a security based notion of foreign policy making -- should increase the likelihood of outside interventions, as would humanitarian concerns -- an issue more consistent with idealist view of foreign policy. The intensity of a conflict straddles the fence between the two forces acting on the decision process. On the one hand highly intense conflicts tend to be associated with the humanitarian concerns of an idealist, and on the other highly intense conflicts may pose severe threats to regional stability, of paramount importance to the realist. But regardless of the usefulness of either of the two paradigms as a mechanism for understanding the decision process, the role of the intensity of the conflict reflects to a large degree the affect of certainty or uncertainty on the decision to intervene. It is quite likely that in intense conflicts both 'q' and 'p' will be low (low expectation that the conflict will be resolved without outside interventions, and low expectation about the efficacy of an intervention). One result of this should be a decreased likelihood of observing outside interventions, even though political leaders may see an intervention as necessary to stop the fighting.

Testable Hypotheses
**Hypothesis 1:** The greater the number of countries bordering an internal conflict the more likely will be outside interventions into the conflict.

The close proximity to the country in conflict increases the expected utility from a successful settlement of the dispute in a number of ways. First, when a country shares a border with a country in conflict the potential for contagion is high. National security is threatened to the extent that instability on a border decreases political control in that region. Additionally, ethnic affinities in cross border communities will generally be higher than in those environments where large distances separate ethnic groups, generating domestic constituencies that influence the decision process. The opportunity and willingness to intervene increases with proximity and have been shown to be related to the increased propensity for wars to expand across territorial boundaries (Siverson and Starr, 1991). Finally, proximity affects both the cost of intervening and the ability to correctly estimate the probability of being successful (e.g. Boulding, 1962). The more countries that are contiguous to the conflict the more likely it is that one or more of them will choose to intervene.

**Hypothesis 2:** Given an ongoing conflict, the greater its intensity the less likely will be outside interventions.

The ferocity with which the conflict is waged contributes to the calculations of the expected outcome of the conflict and the payoff from an intervention. A very intense conflict will generally take a substantial intervention to bring a halt to the fighting; the larger the intervention the greater the costs of adopting such a policy. But also the more intense the conflict the less likely it is that an intervention will be successful, in effect 'p' will be small making the expected utility from intervening low. As mentioned earlier, the "sunk costs" of the combatants is already very high and the emotional climate likely to be feverish. Under these types of conditions anything but a large military force will appear to have a dim chance of success. In Rwanda, April 1994, where tens of thousands of people were being killed per week, the response to the emerging crisis by the small Belgian and UN missions was to pull out rather than be reinforced. It was not until the killing had gone on for three months that the French sent in a military force,
by which time the bulk of the slaughter was over, reducing the necessary magnitude of an intervention and increasing the probability that it would be successful.

There are, of course, benefits to intervening in intense conflicts that result from humanitarian aspects of the mission, but with a low probability of success the intervener is too likely to end up with the least preferred outcome -- a failed intervention. Large countries with global interests might generally have the capability to intervene with the necessary force, but they often lack sufficient national interest in doing so. The smaller countries that stand to gain most from local stability generally lack the capability to intervene in a manner that has a high probability of success. The cases of Rwanda and Burundi epitomize this condition.

**Hypothesis 3:** When there are large social dislocations or concerns about an impending humanitarian crisis the probability of an outside intervention increases.

Massive social dislocations pose moral, logistical, and resource dilemmas for the global community, such that containing the violence that leads to humanitarian crises becomes a prime concern to policy makers. Although potential interveners might have less to gain from a national interest perspective, the domestic costs of not intervening come to the fore when humanitarian issues are at stake. Kohut and Toth (1994) show that one of the few conditions under which the American public will sanction the use of force in an internal conflict is when humanitarian concerns are most salient.

The intensity of a conflict and the potential for a humanitarian crisis may, but need not, be linked. Intense conflicts probably lead to large social dislocations more often than not, but the flow of refugees or widespread famine can result from less intense conflicts just as readily. The first Shaba Crisis in Zaire, 1977, resulted in a relatively small number of fatalities from the conflict but created a relatively large number of refugees and internally displaced persons. On the one hand an intense conflict makes the decision to intervene trickier and less likely, while on the other the humanitarian concerns generally associated with such conflicts makes an intervention alternative more compelling. The utility associated with stopping the carnage is large, with both the cost of inaction and the benefits from a resolute policy high, yet the probability for achieving a successful outcome will be low. As conflicts become increasingly
intense there needs to be greatly increasing benefits to be gained in order to offset the decline in the probability of realizing the desired goals.

**Hypothesis 4:** Interventions in intrastate conflicts will be more likely during the Cold War than in its aftermath.

During the Cold War any internal dispute could easily be cast in terms of the ideological contest waged between the East and West. Internal conflicts that are in areas with strategically important resources, involving regional allies, or in global powers' sphere of influence will provide incentives for intervention. With East-West issues being less salient, however, fewer conflicts generate a sufficient benefit from concerns over the national interest to outweigh potential costs. The caution instilled by the East-West tension during the Cold War contributed to the utility to be gained from confronting the adversary in a third country -- minimizing the potential for a direct confrontation -- and therefore intervening in intrastate conflicts could serve multiple purposes. With the end of the Cold War much less can be justified in terms of the dominant ideological objectives, resulting in a decline in benefits to be derived from intervening. Without this need to counter an intervention by an ideological foe we should see a decrease in the propensity to intervene.

This argument generally runs counter to conventional wisdom and some of the scholarly debate regarding the role of the Cold War as a constraining force in international politics (e.g. Mersheimer, 1990). Internal conflicts, however, have been the fertile ground upon which the Cold War was fought, with war by proxy being the outlet for East-West aggression. Rather than acting as a constraining force the zero-sum environment of the Cold War increased the expected payoff from confronting the adversary on the territory of a third party. With the end of these ideological hostilities unilateral interventions are increasingly constrained by domestic considerations, possibly giving way to a greater propensity for collective interventions (Vertzberger, 1993).

In very general terms we can identify two of the hypotheses with a realpolitik perspective of the role of interventions; one with an idealist perspective; and the forth with conditions that influence the subjective estimate of the likely outcome of an intervention.
Research Design and Testing

The hypotheses outlined above were tested against data on intrastate conflicts in the post World War II era. The unit of analysis is the conflict. The cases of interstate conflict are those identified by Regan (1996), including both his conflicts with and without interventions. There are 89 conflicts with intervention; 49 without. There are conceptual issues associated with using the conflict as the unit of analysis that should be addressed up front. A focus on the conflict shifts the emphasis of the empirical model from the individual decision maker to the aggregate case, and examines whether certain structural and contextual conditions increase the probability of an intervention. The reasoning and implications of this unit of analysis warrant an explanation.

The use of the conflict as the unit of analysis is ultimately borne of the difficulty of identifying all relevant dyads, including those that may have considered intervening but chose not to. The potential for selection bias -- either over or under sampling -- is large. The usefulness of the results to follow will turn in part on the validity of the inferences that we can draw from the evidence relating conditions of the conflict to an intervention, and then to the decision making process itself. In trying to arrive at the dyad as the unit of analysis a difficult question revolves around just what dyads to use. If you use all possible dyads then there is an obvious bias toward the non-intervention decision. If only cases of conflicts with interventions are chosen, then there is a strong bias toward the intervention decision, and we would never know which countries considered but rejected that option. Lemke (1995) argues that there are relevant dyads defined in terms of regional -- or geographic -- criteria, though such criteria come in to question when the issues involve intervention in civil conflicts. Each conceivable method has its own conceptual and empirical liabilities.

One of the key elements of a dyadic analysis would be to pick up instances where intervention was considered but rejected, on grounds consistent with the model. But a dyadic analysis would not necessarily bring us any closer to this ideal, unless we had the ideal way of determining the population of potential interveners in each conflict. In order to pick up the "non-intervention -- though considered it" cases there would have to be some visible trace consistently left behind from the deliberative process. In most instances identifying the existence of these deliberations in the public domain would be a

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monumental task, and any resulting population most likely would result in a serious challenge to the reliability and validity of the data. One way to attempt to identify conditions of relevancy in defining dyads is to look for an indication of threats to intervene that were ultimately not carried out. If there were common characteristics to these threatening states, then a condition for dyadic relevancy could be established. A random sample of the conflicts used in this analysis were surveyed in search of visible traces of threats to intervene. Presumably cases of interventions would generally be preceded by threats to do so, though clear threats were not always evident. But more importantly in instances of non-intervention threats might betray elements of an evaluation of an intervention option which was never exercised. Just over 50% of the cases of non-intervention were included in the sample (27) and of those 27 non-intervention cases, in six instances there were indications of threats to intervene. Unfortunately those six cases did not reveal any common characteristic from which to draw inferences about relevant dyads, nor might their numbers been sufficient to do so had a common theme developed. The further implication is that no outside actor considered intervening in the other 21 cases, though this is a difficult argument to sustain.

Ultimately it is the decision process that is key to understanding the choices made, but each decision is predicated on a number of domestic and international conditions that constrain choices and influence the decision process. We can advance our understanding of the decision making process by closely examining the conditions under which certain types of decisions are made. Strong evidence relating structural or contextual conditions to certain types of decisions can allow us to draw inferences about how those conditions affect the decision calculus.

Since the counterfactual question of who considered intervening, but chose not to, is difficult to disentangle conceptually and empirically, I will postpone that task until it becomes more manageable. For the empirical analysis, then, I use the conflict as the unit of analysis, control the multivariate model for the number of shared borders, and skirt the issue of the counterfactual claim that all states are potential interveners. While not the ideal, focusing on the conflict does allow us to draw meaningful inferences about the decision criteria of potential interveners by evaluating the hypotheses derived from the theoretical model; we can then infer from the structural and contextual constraints to the decision criteria used by a decision maker. Although often less explicit, this approach to understanding political outcomes is a well used strategy throughout the study of world politics.
The theoretical framework that structures this research suggests a set of conditions under which interventions will or will not be undertaken. The yes/no nature of the question requires an analytical tool that can incorporate dichotomous outcomes. A logit procedure satisfies this requirement. A logit estimator is much like Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) but it makes a very different assumption about the distribution of the outcome variable. OLS assumes that data on the outcome variable can range from positive to negative infinity, and therefore the errors are distributed normally. A dichotomous choice variable violates these assumptions and can therefore lead to biased and inconsistent estimates of the effect of the explanatory variables. The estimated coefficients associated with the logit are not interpretable in the same way that an OLS generated coefficient is; a further transformation is required to determine marginal effects. The sign associated with the logit coefficients, however, does reflect the direction of the marginal impact. The specification of the logit model that will predict the likelihood that a third party will intervene in an ongoing civil conflict is as follows:

\[
\text{Intervention} = \alpha + \beta_1 \times \text{casualties} + \beta_2 \times \text{intensity} + \beta_3 \times \text{humanitarian issues} + \beta_4 \times \text{Cold War} \\
+ \beta_5 \times \text{number of borders} + \varepsilon
\]

**Operational Criteria**

The operational definitions and sources of data for each of the variables are as follows:

1) Contiguity is operationalized in terms of the Correlates of War definition which incorporates either a shared border or less than 150 miles of water separating two otherwise contiguous land masses. The indicator used is the number of contiguous countries to the one involved in the conflict.

2) Conflict Intensity is operationalized in terms of the number of casualties per year. Data on casualties and duration were adopted from Regan (1996).

3) Humanitarian issues was operationalized in terms of refugee flows, with 50,000 internally displaced persons or external refugees used as the cutoff between a crisis and a non-crisis. The variable was coded 1
if there was a crisis; otherwise zero. Data were taken from the annual report of the US Committee for Refugees (USCR) and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). Unfortunately there is no systematic reporting on refugee flows prior to 1960 and there is no reasonably comprehensive alternative. For conflicts prior to 1960 I relied primarily on the NY Times for data, but also on specific historical narratives to try to minimize the amount of missing data. The number of missing cases is 8; four of which had interventions, four did not.

4) The Cold War is considered to be over as of January 1, 1989. While any date that "ends the Cold War" is somewhat arbitrary, January 1989 marks the transition from Ronald Reagan to George Bush in the American Presidency and only predates the complete destruction of the Berlin Wall and the political unification of East and West Germany by a relatively short period of time. By 1989 Mikhail Gorbachev's revolution was sufficiently entrenched to allow the US and the USSR to increasingly find areas of issue convergence rather than divergence. Conflicts such as Nicaragua, Afghanistan and Angola were beginning to wind down, and by 1990 the US and the USSR were cooperating in the struggle to oust Iraq from Kuwait. Pre and post Cold War conflicts were coded dichotomously.

**Empirical Results**

In general the results of the analysis confirm the central arguments presented above, with one exception. The role of borders, it appears, has the opposite affect on the likelihood that an outside actor will intervene. For the other variables in the model the sign of the coefficients are in the direction predicted by the theoretical argument and for all but one we have a reasonably high degree of confidence that they are not the result of chance.

Table 1 presents the results of the logit analysis in terms of the coefficients associated with each of the explanatory variables. In broad terms we can evaluate the effect of specific variables by the sign of its coefficient, though a more substantive interpretation can be developed from Table 2. We can see, for instance, that an increase in the intensity of the conflict and the number of shared borders decrease the probability of an outside intervention (Table 1), while all the other factors increased the likelihood of an
intervention. The model itself is robust -- as evidenced by the log likelihood -- and the marginal effects of the explanatory variables are considerable.

The substantive effect of the individual variables on the probability that we would observe an intervention are generally strong (Table 2). For example, to judge the marginal effects of each variable we can use a hypothetical conflict as a base. For descriptive purposes this hypothetical conflict is one in which 1) the intensity was low, 2) it took place after the end of the Cold War, 3) there were less than 50,000 refugees, 4) there is only one bordering country, and 5) the number of casualties were low. In this hypothetical environment the model suggests that there would be a 50% chance of observing an intervention. This hypothetical case, moreover, is not without close analogies in the referent world. Lebanon, 1988-90, Moldova, 1992, and the Bougainville conflict in Papua New Guinea meet these "hypothetical" conditions, with the exception that Moldova and Lebanon have more than one shared border. In the first two conflicts there were outside interventions; in Papua New Guinea there was not.

(Table 1 about Here)

When holding each variable at the base value and varying the intensity of the conflict we can see that when the intensity is high, the probability of observing an intervention drops to only 15%, a 35% reduction in the likelihood of observing an intervention. This effect is also graduated, as can be seen by a more modest increase in the intensity level. This is consistent with theoretical expectations, and would appear to reflect the increasing difficulty of conceiving of a successful outcome as the level of conflict intensity rises. The Cold War increased the probability of an intervention by 25%, such that a low intensity conflict with a relatively small number of casualties had a 75% chance of having an outside intervention if it was during the Cold War. Again, consistent with theoretical expectations. Likewise, the existence of a humanitarian crisis associated with the conflict increases the probability of an intervention by 10% to 60%, and conflicts with casualties approaching 200,000 have a near certainty of attracting an outside intervener. This could, in part, reflect the effect of the intervener on the conflict itself, where the intervention leads to greater numbers of casualties, though direct evidence is difficult to ascertain (Regan 1996; Pearson 1974).
However we might also expect conflicts with these characteristics to generate public support for an intervention on ethical grounds.

(Table 2 About Here)

The number of shared borders, on the other hand, tends to reduce the probability of an outside intervention. This is a puzzling result and runs directly counter to the hypothesized relationship. From Table 2 we can see that shifting the loci of a conflict from one with a single bordering country to one with five contiguous neighbors decreases the probability of an intervention by 19%. There are three plausible explanations, though no one seems sufficiently compelling to account for the counter-intuitive result: 1) that as the region in which the conflict rages gets more congested the potential volatility in that region breeds caution, functionally that neighboring states worry that their involvement may lead to them becoming involved in the fray as a combatant; 2) that the collective action problem comes to the forefront, leading all states to deny responsibility for action; and 3) that it is an artifact of the data, and really there are many more interventions that were not picked up in the coding process. In essence this would suggest that as the number of bordering states increase the effort to ensure plausible also increases. Interventions become deeply covert and traces in the public domain are difficult to find. Of the three potential explanations the last one is the most difficult to defend and the first one most intuitively appealing. If it were a data problem the results would probably not be so systematic and robust, which they are, and time would tend to reveal even the most covert of interventions. The collective action explanation assumes that there is a perceived "responsibility" to settle the conflict, when in the pull and haul of international politics it is more likely allies, enemies, and resources than responsibility that guide the decision, particularly if the conflict is in a bordering country and has the potential to spread. It is that fear of a contagious conflict that may compel states to avoid intervention when the number or size of potential coalitions increase. The lack of a good explanation for the finding suggests that the notion of "opportunity and willingness" needs to be reexamined (Siverson and Starr, 1991).

Discussion
Over all the results of the analyses lend support for the general framework of the model, suggesting that the decision to intervene results from a mixture of constraints imposed from domestic and international quarters. Feste (1992) and Bull (1984) for example, focus too narrowly on the role of geopolitics as the condition for intervention, and Blechman (1995) is on firm ground when he argues that domestic politics can drive the decision to intervene when humanitarian issues come to the fore. Neither realist nor idealist explanations, however, appear to be sufficient to account for outside interventions in civil conflicts. For example, excluding either set of variables from the model virtually eliminates any level of statistical confidence we have in the results. We can infer from these results that strategic interests are important in the intervention calculus, but so too are domestic political considerations, as evidenced by the high probability of interventions when humanitarian issues come to the fore. Consistent with a growing body of literature, the rigid realpolitik model of the world does not hold up well (e.g. Stam, 1996).

In terms of specific inferences and implications there are a few important points that are evident in this analysis. First, the Cold War was clearly a major factor in the decision to intervene. Although the majority of the conflicts used in this analysis were not ideologically based (see Regan 1996), the polarized structure associated with the Cold War apparently weighed heavily in the decisionmaking process. Two things probably happen as the system becomes less polarized: 1) there is a decrease in pressure to intervene on geostrategic grounds, and 2) interventions begin to take on a multilateral character under the auspices of the United Nations or some other supranational organization. The first response is consistent with both the logic and the evidence presented above. The outcome of civil conflicts is no longer viewed in rigid zero-sum terms, and therefore there is less to gain from offsetting the potential advances of an adversary. Furthermore, without the pressure to compete ideologically collective efforts are easier to organize and implement. This is also consistent with what we see in our referent world, and there is some evidence to support this conclusion (Regan, 1997).

Second, the centrality of subjective estimates of the likely outcome of an intervention cannot be overstated. If the intensity of a conflict is a valid indicator of subjective estimates of successful intervention policies, then these estimates appear to play a critical role in determining the outcome of policy debates. This result is convergent with a casual understanding of recent history -- at least as it pertains to the United States. The need for a high degree of certainty about short time frames and successful outcomes tended to
drive recent debates about US interventions into Haiti (1994), Bosnia (1995), and Zaire (1996). One way to turn a short-term policy into a long-term intervention is to have a low estimate of the probability of success at the time the decision was made, and to make the decision to intervene anyway. Uncertainty over likely outcomes, therefore, shows up as a declining probability of interventions.

Third, humanitarian issues do seem to matter in decisions about how to respond to civil conflicts. Survey research has made clear -- again, at least in the US -- that people do see a legitimate role of government to be relieving some of the social stresses caused by civil conflicts (Kohut and Toth 1994; Blechman 1995). The evidence here supports this notion and suggests that governments do respond to these humanitarian pressures. In some instances the response to massive refugee flows may be couched in terms of national security (Dowty and Louscher 1996), but this clearly cannot be the dominant case and regardless of further grounds for justification, domestic constituencies do seem to matter in these types of decisions.

And finally, the role of geographic contiguity needs to be addressed. As discussed earlier none of the explanations for the counter-intuitive result that the greater the number of shared borders the less likely an intervention makes much sense. The role of geographic contiguity in the diffusion of interstate conflict seems well established (see Siverson and Starr 1991), yet that established pattern runs diametrically opposed to the results of this study. A realist view that states act in pursuit of power or stability would point toward decisive action in a neighboring conflict, and there may be a way in which this is consistent with the evidence presented here. Since an intervention would deplete resources, as the number of potential adversaries increase (i.e., a greater number of shared borders) the intervening state would increase its vulnerability through the process of intervening itself. In a hostile strategic environment this depletion of resources in a neighbors conflict might have grave consequences for domestic security, possibly leading to constraints in the decision process. In any event the lack of a clear and logical explanation calls for further investigation, particularly in an attempt to rectify the discrepancy in the relationship across inter- and inter-state conflicts.

In the referent world, moreover, these results look quite compelling. The example of Rwanda is useful. During the Rwandan upheaval of 1994 most states were clearly reluctant to take decisive and unilateral action. The killing was so intense that smaller neighboring states were probably incapable of
bringing the slaughter to an end; the capable states were unwilling to try. Essentially, estimates of ‘p’ -- the probability that an intervention would succeed -- were too low. The magnitude of the killing and the impending refugee crisis, however, meant that ethical issues surfaced within the global community. France eventually did take unilateral action, largely motivated by political and humanitarian considerations (Adelman and Suhkri, 1996). Zaire has also suffered the fate of numerous internal conflicts since independence from Belgium in 1960. In 1962 and 1967 Western allies intervened decisively in Zairian conflicts, as well there were some hints of Soviet interventions (US DoS, 1994). The civil war of 1996, however, generated a serious discussion about intervening, but no country chose to take unilateral action and the appropriate conditions for a multilateral intervention could not be reached. The Cold War was over.

Given the prevalence of interventions into civil conflicts we have only a meager systematic understanding of their affect, and even less about the conditions under which they are undertaken. This void of knowledge has become much more pronounced as the world's collective gaze has shifted from Cold War politics to regional conflicts. The question posed at the outset asked about the conditions under which third parties will intervene in civil conflicts. Employing a decision theoretic framework I articulated four expectations regarding the conditions for military or economic interventions. Using data on intrastate conflicts in the post-W.W.II period I tested these hypotheses using a multivariate logit regression.

The results suggest that there are identifiable conditions under which states will self-select out of an intervention opportunity, but this does not answer all the necessary questions. To push this analysis further research should move back toward the context in which specific decisions were made. Doing so would greatly increase our understanding of the decision calculus, though it requires the specification of a population of potential interveners that reflects a plausible, yet comprehensive pool of cases (e.g. Lemke 1996). An understanding of the outcome of interventions requires attention to be focused on the vexing problem of determining when states choose to intervene.

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1. On the other hand the effect of an intervention on the course of the conflict would be a result of strategic calculations on the part of the belligerants. From that perspective, perceptions about the outcome of an
intervention are endogenous to the relationship between the belligerants (see Smith, 1996). This however is a different question than the one posed here.

2 These two steps in the decision process may be evaluated simultaneously, though this does not change the usefulness of the conceptual framework developed here. Expressing the decision as a simultaneous process would yield

\[ E_{\text{Uni}} - E_{\text{Ui}} = [q(Us) + (1-q)(Uc) - SC_{ni}] - [p(Usw) + (1-p)(Uf) - SC_i]; \]

when \( E_{\text{Uni}} - E_{\text{Ui}} > 0 \), then there would be no intervention.

Furthermore, if you assume a preference over outcomes such that \( Us > Usw > Uc > Uf \), then even when 'q' is high and a halt to the fighting quite likely an outside actor would be unlikely to intervene. Similarly, with \( Uc \) being preferred to \( Uf \) it would only be under extreme conditions where a low estimate of 'p' would lead to an intervention.

3 The model also suggests that when 'p' and 'q' are in some middle range -- when uncertainty over the outcome of the conflict or the intervention is high -- then states may use threats of intervention to generate more information. This is left as a topic for further research but would be consistent with much of Fearon's research on signalling in crises (1994).

4 Unlike some efforts to test hypotheses derived from expected utility models (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita, 1985), I do not attempt to estimate the utility, the costs, nor the subjective estimates of the probability of different outcomes for specific interveners. Rather than develop indicators of these components of the model I take them as latent -- or unobserved -- variables and instead develop indicators of those factors that should influence each component of the model. The variables in the empirical model generally reflect contextual conditions associated with the conflict, and as will be discussed below I use these characteristics of the conflict to identify which types of conflicts are most likely to attract outside interveners. From this we can intuit the role of those conditions in leading to the decision to intervene or not.

5 There are two conflicts in Regan's data that were coded as non-interventions, but were recoded to reflect the existence of clear third party interventions: Djibouti, 1991; Colombia, 1949-62.
This transformation is carried out by the following operation \( \log(P/(1-P)) = (X_1 \cdot b_1) + (X_2 \cdot b_2) + \ldots + (X_3 \cdot b_3) \), varying each value of \( X_1, \ldots, X_n \). Exponentiating the equation gives \( P/(1-P) = e^S \) equation1. Solving for \( P \) gives the probability of success (see Roncek, 1991).
Selected Bibliography


Kohut, Andrew and Robert C. Toth. 1994. "Arms and the People". *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 73, no. 6 pp47-61.


Table 1
Logit Model for Interventions in Intrastate Conflicts, N=130

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Sig</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intensity</td>
<td>-1.8E-05</td>
<td>8.02E-06</td>
<td>.04*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.00 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties</td>
<td>1.5E-05</td>
<td>6.43E-06</td>
<td>.01 **</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. borders</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.04*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-2 Log Likelihood = 144.1
Chi Square Test = 36.1 with 5 d.f.; p<.000

* p < .05; ** p < .01

Note: Significance tests are used simply to demonstrate the statistical strength of the patterns evident in the data. Since the population of cases is used in the analysis there is no broader pool of cases to which one can draw inferences about the likelihood of observing similar patterns.

Predicted Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No-Intervene</th>
<th>Intervene</th>
<th>Pct Correct</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Observed Outcomes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No intervene</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>37.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervene</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>87.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall Correct Predictions 70%


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Base &quot;hypothetical&quot; Conflict</th>
<th>Prob. Interven</th>
<th>Change in Prob.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low Intensity (1000)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Cold War</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Bordering Country</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Refugee Crisis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Casualties (1000)</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**From Base**

**To High Intensity**

(Int=120K; Casualty=30K) | .15 | -35%
(Int=20K; Casualty=5K)  | .43 | -7%

**From Base**

**To Cold War**

.75 | 25%

**From Base**

**To Refugee Crisis**

.60 | 10%

**From Base**

**To High Casualty**

(Casualty=200K; Intense=2000) | .94 | 44%

**From Base**

**To #shared Borders**

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>-4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>-8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>-19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>-31%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>