Chapter 1
Introduction

In 1967 the United States sent military transport planes to Zaire in order to help ferry Zairian troops to the front lines to put down an anti-government insurrection. A reading of government documents from that period suggests that US decision makers were uncertain about the appropriate actions and the particular strategy that might work if they chose to intervene (Dept. of State, 1994). McGeorge Bundy, likewise, is attributed with assigning an estimate of the likely success of a US intervention into the Vietnam conflict at somewhere between 25% and 75%. With some regularity decision makers around the globe are contemplating an intervention into a civil conflict. Their motives for intervening are varied, as are most historical interpretations of the outcomes of these interventions. A common thread across most such decisions is the lack of an understanding about the conditions for successful interventions into civil conflicts. This book aims to reduce the uncertainty faced by decision makers contemplating an intervention by increasing our understanding of the types of interventions that work best under a given set of conditions.

The settlement of civil conflicts can be a function of each sides ability to manipulate the costs of continued combat. Outside interventions -- either military or economic -- provide one mechanism for the manipulation of both the costs of continued conflict and the benefits of achieving a settlement. One way to think about this is that if one side can increase the costs to an opponent from continued fighting, they at the same time increase their opponents incentives to settle the conflict (Pillar, 1983). Third parties can and do contribute to this manipulation of the costs and benefits, but there is little systematic knowledge describing the most effective way to do so. Framing the logic from the perspective of the decision maker deliberating over a prospective intervention and using evidence compiled from all civil conflicts in the post-WWII period, I will demonstrate that there are systematic patterns between intervention strategies and outcomes. The results of the analysis will increase our theoretical understanding of the role of outside actors in internal conflicts, as well as point to policy relevant prescriptions.
My argument will work from the premise that stopping the fighting between combatants is the main goal of third party interventions, and although not a goal subscribed to by all interveners, it appears to be a common objective in the history of international interventions. Identifying the conditions that lead to such an outcome has a range of potential benefits. First and foremost, identifying the strategies for intervening that have a high probability of stopping the fighting serves as a useful yardstick from which to evaluate policies. Second, much of the literature on conflict resolution asserts that military stalemates or an impending victory make the conditions ripe for diplomatic efforts. A first step to diplomacy, however, may be the cessation of hostilities. And finally, if we develop an understanding of how to stop the fighting in internal conflicts we open up avenues for research into the steps that can be taken to push beyond the mere settlement of conflicts toward their long term resolution. In short, we can ask what a short-term respite in the fighting buys us in terms of long-term resolution, the equitable distribution of political and economic resources, and global or regional stability.

Of critical importance to the policy community is an answer to the questions of "when to intervene" and "under what conditions will which type of intervention strategy be most successful". If policymakers are going to commit the resources of their country in some distant land they have an abiding interest in picking the right conflict and the correct strategy for intervening. The use of systematic, comprehensive, and rigorous analysis should inform policymakers grappling with those dicey questions of when, where and how. Currently we lack coherent explanations that can account for the conditions conducive to interventions and the strategies likely to be successful. Without such explanations future policy is likely to remain ad hoc.

This book will sidestep issues of whether intervening is an ethical alternative open to members of the world community; others have addressed those issues much more cogently than I could (e.g. Reed and Kaysen, 1993; Damrosch and Scheffer, 1991). For example there is considerable discussion about the moral implications of outside interventions in internal conflicts and the conditions under which the goals of the intervener meet such moral criteria. I take this as a completely separate line of inquiry and proceed from the premise that once the ethical concerns have been addressed practical considerations about what works, when, where, and how come to the fore. These two considerations are, of course, related. By almost any normative
standard, interventions that exacerbate an existing conflict are bad for the intervenee, the intervener, and the
global community. Even an intervention undertaken with the most humane of intentions can create a rapidly
deteriorating situation when the policy is either ill-conceived or poorly implemented. The US directed
intervention in Somalia is a case in point. The intervention was initially designed to keep the warring clans at
bay long enough to avert the famine taking root in the countryside. As the Somali clans became more
emboldened the US forces became more hostile, leading eventually to the complete withdrawal of outside
forces under somewhat incriminating circumstances. If this work has a contribution to make it will be in
increasing the likelihood that interventionary policies adopted by members of the global village will be
successful at stopping the fighting between internal opposition groups. Hopefully the conditions for success
will be convergent with the conditions that make interventions ethically acceptable and contribute to efforts
to achieve a long-term solution to the conflict.

One might ask why this issue is so important to the foreign policy community, or more generally to
the body politic. The United States, for instance, has undertaken a number of recent efforts to intervene in
ongoing intra-state conflicts; some of those attempts are quite visible to the American public, some
seemingly quite effective, and for others the jury is still out. Both the public and the political leadership want
desperately to avoid the debacles, such as Somalia, while the leadership, at least, strives to minimize the
political costs of intervening. If internal conflicts pose a threat to the wider community -- not to mention
imposing immense burdens on the health and well-being of civilian populations -- then the world at large has
an interest in the resolution of these conflicts. Outside interventions happen to be one mechanism available
with which to contribute to the resolution process. When acting intelligently there is a role to play for the
world community in trying to stop the fighting in civil conflicts. The conflict in Bosnia makes this clear.

At the time this book was begun the US was debating the merits of sending in a military force to act
as peacekeepers in the Bosnian conflict. Other interventions -- Britain's and France's the most prominent --
under the auspices of the United Nations had not proven very effective, nor had either the economic
sanctions placed on Serbia and Bosnia, or the US airdrops of food and medical supplies to the "protected
enclaves". Given the brief history of the current phase of the conflict -- the rape, plunder, pillage, and mass
murder carried out by the warring sides -- and the long running historical enmity between the Serbs (largely Orthodox Christian), Croats (largely Catholics), and the Muslims, one must wonder whether outside actors can bring a halt to the carnage. Reflecting the American public's concern with bearing the human costs, the Congress resisted pressures to support the Administration. What were the chances that outside actors could play an effective role in this conflict? Is a "big stick" the best way to intervene, or should a "big carrot" be offered instead -- or in conjunction with the "stick"? Are these types of conflicts resolvable through outside interventions, or will they reach quicker more lasting resolutions without third parties taking an active role?

As the book neared completion the jury is still out in Bosnia. The US, along with other countries, sent in 20,000 troops and the global community pledged hundreds of millions of dollars in redevelopment assistance. By early 1998 the fighting remains largely in abeyance and efforts are being made to resolve the conflict. Time will tell whether the respite from the fighting can be translated into long-standing peaceful coexistence, if not cooperation.

Whether or not the characteristics of the conflict or the strategy for intervening is in any way related to the outcome of the policy is the crux of the issue under scrutiny here. This book proposes that interventions should best be thought of in terms of decisions to intervene, for which the subsequent success or failure is a function of the context of the conflict and the strategy adopted by the intervener. When the expectations are such that the rewards are slight and the costs prohibitive, then we should not expect to see many interventions. And as we will discuss shortly, the decision to intervene is laden with political costs that go far beyond the resources expended. The structure of a particular cost function for a decision to intervene will help determine if an interventionary policy will be adopted, and if so, what the strategy for intervening will look like.

Making the Decision to Intervene

Why states decide to unilaterally intervene in civil conflicts remains an elusive question. While most would agree that there are a set of conditions that compel interventions -- or at least make them increasingly likely -- what those conditions are is a matter of debate. Some scholars see international politics and the
superpower rivalry as the main explanation for interventions (Bull, 1984; Morgenthau, 1967; Feste, 1992), though others look for explanations rooted in domestic and organizational politics (Yarmolinsky, 1968), cultural affinities between the people in the target and intervening countries (Carment and James, 1995a; Davis and Moore, 1997), or the moral commitments of an intervening state (Blechman, 1995).

The question of whether it is international or domestic politics that drives the decision to intervene is, as I see it, somewhat diversionary. Surely the decision involves many factors, encompassing a range of domestic and international considerations. But more importantly, interventions are undertaken when there is a reasonable expectation that the goals are achievable given the strategy for intervening and the conditions of the conflict. Rarely would one expect a political leader to choose to intervene under circumstances where they expected the intervention to fail. An intervention may be unsuccessful for domestic or international reasons, just as it may be undertaken for either reason.

If we accept the notion that decisionmaking forms the basis for understanding interventions into intrastate conflicts, and that structural characteristics and attributes of the conflict contribute to the decisional calculus, then decision theoretic approaches can be particularly useful in formulating hypotheses about when and if we might expect interventions, at least those undertaken unilaterally. Decision theoretic analyses rely on the notion that the costs and benefits of alternatives and outcomes are evaluated, they are judged in relation to expectations that a given alternative will achieve the desired outcome, and that the decision rule dictates that the strategy with the highest expected net benefit will be adopted (Bueno de Mesquita, 1985). While at times these assumptions might strain intuitive conceptions of decisionmaking within the context of civil conflicts, they can offer a benchmark from which to judge empirical results. My use of a rational choice framework is not designed to allow me to present a formalized mathematical depiction of the decision process from which an equilibrium outcome can be deduced, but rather to set up a conceptual blueprint that will allow us to think coherently about the decision process and the inputs that shape the outcomes. To some degree this sets up the conceptual strawperson who makes decisions based on certain well defined criteria. The results of the analysis can be judged relative to the efficacy of our hypothetical decisionmaker. Inferences can then be drawn intelligently and accordingly.
Decisionmakers contemplating interventions must ask three basic questions: 1) how likely is it that the intervention will alter the course of the conflict, 2) will there be support from their international and domestic constituencies, and 3) what strategy for intervention is best suited to the particular conflict. Answers to these questions will determine if, when, and how a leader will choose to intervene. I posit at the outset that interventions will take place when a) there is a reasonable expectation for success, b) the projected time horizon for achieving the outcome is short, and c) domestic opposition is minimal (see Blechman, 1995; Daalder, 1996). One of the main problems faced by the decision maker is that they simply have little ex ante knowledge about the most successful strategies for intervening. In effect answers to points 1 and 2 are incomplete and ad hoc, leading to considerable uncertainty regarding the evaluation of point 'a'. The chapters to follow will outline the theoretical logic that guides the decision process and then use data on 135 intra-state conflicts in the post-W.W.II era to test ideas about the conditions under which states intervene, and the conditions under which those interventions are likely to be successful.

The data for this analysis will be culled only from intra-state, or civil, conflicts. This is a departure in many ways from the broader body of research into the causes or correlates of third party interventions in that it excludes cases of inter-state conflict. It is a quite common occurrence for one state to intervene in an ongoing conflict between two sovereign countries, or between a sovereign country and an Irredentist group across an international border (see Tillema, 1989; Pearson and Baumann, 1993). Interventionary behavior, furthermore, is often taken to form the basis for understanding the expansion or diffusion of war, and to some extent the willingness to intervene in an international conflict is implicit in alliance membership (Smith, 1996; Levy, 1981; Siverson and Starr, 1991; Siverson and King, 1979). The emphasis here, however, is on strictly internal conflicts, those that originate within the borders of a country and largely remain isolated as such. The reasons for this are fairly straightforward, 1) there is to date very little systematic work on third party interventions into intra-state conflicts, 2) these types of conflicts appear to be increasing in number and geographic diversity, and 3) the decision to intervene seems to pose particularly thorny issues for the political leadership. International law -- if not norms -- proscribes interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states, except under a narrow range of circumstances, so interventions are almost always shrouded in some
form of official rationale or normative justifications. The relative paucity of systematic research into interventions in civil conflicts can be tied largely to the overarching emphasis on and threat of international conflict. With the end of the Cold War came ideas about threats to security and international stability have sifted somewhat, and civil conflicts are much more central to foreign policy making communities.

**Conceptual Issues and Definitions**

**Forms of Intervention**

Third party interventions can take on many forms. The focus of this work is on two specific instruments of interventions that are used with some regularity: military and economic. This emphasis comes at the exclusion diplomatic instruments that can be brought to bear on conflicting parties, such as the use of good offices, mediation, arbitration, and international forums. There are conceptual differences that warrant the exclusion of diplomacy -- at least at this juncture -- and a brief word seems in order. Diplomatic interventions generally have lower costs than more intrusive forms of interventions, they pose lower levels of risk, and the decisional calculus required to commit to a diplomatic intervention is different from that required when military or economic instruments are considered. Diplomatic interventions are generally targeted at solidifying the status quo, whereas other forms of intervention often attempt to alter the status quo on the ground. US deliberations over policies toward the Bosnian civil war reflect this difference between diplomatic and other forms of intervention. For example the United States organized a forum for the warring parties of the former Yugoslavia to attempt to reach a peace accord, with the US playing an active role in brokering an acceptable outcome. In this effort there was little political risk from failure, though much to be gained from a successful outcome. Under such circumstances if it was successful a major foreign policy achievement would be proclaimed; if the forum broke up without a resolution, it would have been portrayed as a noble attempt in spite of the recalcitrance of the implacable participants. In any event the public did not debate the merits or costs of hosting the peace negotiations. At the same time, however, the US Congress seriously debated the prospects of sending 20,000 US troops to Bosnia in an attempt to enforce any peace agreement reached at the bargaining table. Needless to say, some of the characteristics of a conflict
associated with successful military and/or economic interventions are probably similar to those associated with success at the diplomatic table, though this will remain an empirical question to be addressed through further research.

The three questions and criteria mentioned above are not as central to the decision to engage in diplomatic efforts, largely because the decisionmaker incurs lower costs and can walk away from unsuccessful efforts without being unduly scarred by the process. Military or economic interventions pose an entirely different problem. First of all, these types of interventions are an attempt to change the balance of power within the civil conflict itself (Freedman, 1994:9). By interjecting military equipment or troops in support of one side in the conflict the relative capabilities of the combatants is altered -- this is generally the intention of the intervener. Economic instruments -- either sanctions or rewards -- can serve a similar purpose. Witness the military sanctions against the Bosnian government throughout 1993-5, and the economic sanctions placed on Serbia in an effort to curtail their support of the Bosnian Serb forces. US policy in Iraq, under the auspices of the UN, are another clear example of an intervention shifting the balance of capabilities between combatants. The Kurdish opposition groups are able to organize largely because of the "no fly zones" imposed on Iraq. The cruise missile attack by the United States in 1996, and the widening of the no fly zone, in response to Iraqi attempts to move into Kurdish regions drastically constrains Iraq's ability to prosecute the struggle against the Kurds. Implicit in any effort to alter the balance of power between combatants is the notion that by creating an equality of capabilities (or a disparity) the supported side has the ability to either fight to a stalemate or compel the other side to acquiesce.

Any type of intervention comes with risks, costs and potential benefits to the political leadership in the intervening country. The tangible costs are generally a function of the human and material resources expended in pursuit of the foreign policy goal, but these costs translate into political costs as a function of the success or failure of the policy. It is these political costs that are most salient to the policy community and they are a product of 1) the interest of a domestic constituency in a particular conflict and 2) the outcome of an intervention.
For instance Carment et al (1996) argue that a strong ethnic affinity between the people in the warring country and those in a potential intervening country is a necessary condition for intervention. This suggests that there are not only costs to intervening, but also costs to not intervening under some circumstances. On the other hand, the evening news showing pictures of the bodies of soldiers being dragged through the streets makes the policy look like a failure, and incurs a large cost in terms of public support. Somalia in 1994 epitomized this situation, and it was shortly thereafter that the United States withdrew its forces. Not all intervening countries, however, are subject to the political scrutiny so prevalent in liberal democratic states, though to some extent all political leaders face questions of legitimacy based on the character of their domestic and international policies. According to Carment and James (1995a; and with Rowlands, 1996) the institutional framework within which decisions are made can also influence the costs of intervening, with low institutional constraints and high ethnic affinities leading to greater pressures to intervene. The key to minimizing the costs to the political leadership is to advance a policy that: 1) has a high probability of success, 2) adopts the appropriate instruments for the task at hand, and 3) requires a minimum of exposure to both opposing forces and domestic pressure. Adopting a policy with regard to the civil conflict that has a high probability of being "successful" minimizes the political costs to the leadership. Conversely, in some instances the policy choice that affords the greatest expected net benefit is to not intervene.

Knowing when to select alternatives other than intervention may be just as important to the decision maker as it is to know how to intervene successfully once the decision to intervene has been made. Since unsuccessful policies will generally incur greater political costs than successful ones, the basis for forming expectations is crucial. According to Neustadt and May (1986) generalizations made from history should play a central role in current deliberations, but although analogies to "most similar cases" can form a useful guide, history points to the need for a more systematic foundation for drawing expectations. Regardless of the form of the evidence we use to draw inferences about behavior, clear conceptual and operational definitions are required.
Conceptually an intervention involves the use of one state's resources in an attempt to influence the internal conflict of another state. From a military perspective, this can include military troops, supplies, intelligence or aid. Each of these can serve to buttress the existing forces of either the government or the opposition. Economic interventions can include sanctions or embargoes, or the granting or withdrawal of aid that helps to alleviate (increase) some of the costs of engaging the enemy. But operationally this leaves us far short of a workable definition, the area to which I now turn.

Definitions

The place to start is with a conceptual and operational definition of an intervention. Operationally an intervention must be distinguishable from the notion of influence (Roseneau, 1968). The problem in many respects comes from the entanglement of policies seeking to influence behavior from those attempting to intervene in a conflict, but as Rosenau (1968; 1969) and others (Wriggins, 1968; Hoffman, 1984) have made clear, from a very broad perspective intervention is the business of international relations.

There are two criteria upon which an operational definition of interventions should be built, 1) that interventions are convention-breaking and 2) that they are authority-targeted (Roseneau, 1968, p. 167). The notion of convention breaking allows us to discriminate between the normal course of international influence and those relatively few forms of influence pedaling we label interventions. If we cannot do this then intervention and influence become synonyms in the language of international politics. Although in principle this delineation between conventional and non-conventional should be clearly recognizable, in practice it is not always straightforward, particularly when the focus is on intrastate conflicts. For example, economic assistance can be one form of intervention, yet it can also be just another form of influence (see Wriggins, 1968; Feste, 1992). In a country like El Salvador where US economic aid has been the norm, any economic intervention on behalf of the government or the opposition must demonstrate that 1) changes in the aid program be tied directly to changes in the domestic political conflict, and 2) the changes in aid be sufficient - - in terms of either quantity or quality -- to conform to the conception of convention breaking. This would
most often be easier to observe when the intervention involved military troops or support, while the use of economic forms of intervention may not be as clear cut as one would hope.

The need to have the intervention be targeted at the authority structure is also an integral part of the definition of an intervention. By authority-targeted I am referring implicitly to the goals of the intervener, in that the intervention "...is directed at changing or preserving the structure of political authority in the target society" (Roseneau, 1968, p.167). Manipulating the relative capabilities of the combatants is essentially attempting to do just that. For example, supporting an opposition group -- either militarily or economically -- can change the structure of the relationship between the state and members of society; supporting the government would tend to reinforce existing structures.

Although any given definition will rarely satisfy everybody, researchers must eventually come down on some side of the fence and make clear the operational criteria by which they will judge behavior. I will be no exception. The interpretation of the results must therefore be attentive to just where that fence is placed and on which side of it the researcher has come down. For purposes of this analysis I will define third party interventions in intra-state conflicts as convention breaking military and/or economic activities in the internal affairs of a foreign country targeted at the authority structures of the government with the aim of affecting the balance of power between the government and opposition forces. This definition is quite convergent with that proposed by Feste (1992) and Roseneau (1968), though has a much narrower application in terms of affecting the ability of the antagonists to wage war. This definition imputes a goal to the intervention, which I argue is necessary if the policy is to be systematically evaluated. There are undoubtedly multiple goals associated with any given intervention, though as will be discussed more fully below, I assume that there is one overarching goal of trying to bring an end to the fighting between groups in the civil conflict by manipulating the relative capabilities of the combatants to wage war.

**Defining Success**
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of any intervention attempt we must first have a clear idea of what we mean by success and failure. My point of departure for outlining the goals of the intervener works from the assumption that states intervene to stop the fighting between groups in conflict. Paul Diehl (1993) uses a two dimensional indicator of success, incorporating the limiting of armed conflict and the facilitation of conflict resolution. His focus is on multinational peacekeepers, which are generally used under different circumstances than unilateral interventions, though the primary goal of halting the fighting is critical to either type of intervention and an essential first step in the resolution process (Smith, 1994; Hampson, 1996; Damrosch, 1993). In some instances stopping the fighting is the explicit goal of an intervention, as the post-Dayton interventions in Bosnia seem to make clear. However in many other instances stopping the fighting is more of an implicit goal -- or a means to achieve an explicit goals -- as the US effort in Somalia suggests.

One way to view this is to consider that the intervener tries to sufficiently bolster one side in the conflict in order to compel the opposing side to quit fighting. Continued fighting is rarely, if ever, the goal of a contending group. Ending hostilities can come in many forms, including but not limited to, a negotiated or unilaterally declared cease-fire, the acquiescence of one side in the conflict, or the defeat of one side (Pillar, 1983). Each in its own way would have the effect of stopping the fighting between antagonists, though each may or may not resolve any issues at stake. It is assumed that third parties do not intervene in order to exacerbate or prolong the fighting. The key issue here is the desire by the intervener to bring stability to a specific region; one approach for achieving this -- and the one that is under consideration -- is the active intervention by a third party into the ongoing conflict.

Examples of recent interventions make the imputation of this goal quite reasonable. In Bosnia much of the effort of the intervening countries -- both pre- and post-Dayton -- were directed at bringing a halt to the fighting. Sanctions on Serbia were designed to get them to reign in the Bosnian Serbs; the safe haven concept had the expressed goal of stopping the fighting; and even the discussion of rearming the Bosnian Government was predicated on changing the balance of forces so that the Bosnian Serbs would be compelled to negotiate. Policies toward Rwanda and Somalia had similar objectives. The French efforts in Rwanda were targeted at stopping the slaughter, while in Somalia efforts were initially designed to ensure
stability long enough to avert a famine. The US intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 reflects this objective quite clearly (Lowenthal, 1972), as does the more recent intervention by Nigeria in Sierra Leone (1997). In none of these instances were the interventions targeted at resolving the underlying issues in dispute, nor could one reasonably expect military or economic interventions to do so. The ends are simply inconsistent with the means. Even an intervention like the one carried out by the Soviets in Afghanistan had a distinctive flavor of trying to stop the civil unrest by using massive military force to impose the Soviet will on the people. While the effect was to flame the fires of unrest in Afghanistan, the Soviet policy was designed to stabilize the Afghani political environment and prevent the ascendancy of Islamic fundamentalism so close to the Soviet border. From a Soviet policy perspective their least preferred outcome was the one they ended up with. It would be difficult to imagine that the Afghan conflict is what the Soviet's were out to achieve. Instead, the Soviet's probably thought that they could readily put down opposition to the Afghani government closely aligned with them, and thereby stabilize one of their southern borders. Conversely, the US's response to the Soviet intervention was to support the Muhajadeen from bases in Pakistan. To some this was an effort by the US to impose a burden on the Soviets, but there was a significant political faction within US decision making circles who saw US policy as a mechanism to force the Soviets to negotiate their way out of Afghanistan (Scott, 1996). Increasing the probability of a stalemate was the avenue to a negotiated withdrawal.

Imputing this goal to the intervention process consciously excludes the role of trying to resolve the underlying issues involved in the dispute from the motivations behind the decision to intervene. Solving the often deep-seated issues associated with ethnic, religious, or ideological conflicts will require a much more concerted effort than the type of interventions addressed here (see Horowitz, 1985; Gurr, 1993; Burton, 1990; Carment, 1993). However, stopping the carnage associated with these conflicts is quite often the necessary first step before diplomatic initiatives can begin. Burton (1990) articulates a needs based theory of conflict resolution, arguing that in order to resolve the underlying issues in the conflict emphasis must be placed on addressing concerns such as identity and security. Kriesberg, furthermore, posits that outside interventions may be required when trying to move a conflict toward resolution. If a conflict is in a violent
phase, outside interveners may facilitate the stopping of the fighting, thereby allowing the resolution process to proceed (1994). Zartman's (1989) hurting stalemate can also be a product of the kinds of interventions referred to here. If such a precipice or plateau are necessary for negotiations to succeed (Tovaul and Zartman, 1989), then military or economic instruments may contribute to the development of precipice or plateau conditions.

Others have articulated a broader range of motivations behind interventions. For example, territorial acquisition, regional stability, protection of the intervener's diplomatic, economic, or military interests, ideology, and the upholding of human rights have all been identified as goals of intervention (Pearson, 1974; Cooper and Berdal, 1993). To a large degree each of these are consistent with, and often a consequence of, stopping the actual military conflict between parties. One might argue further that the goal of intervention is to destabilize, not stabilize the local environment. If that is a goal then, 1) there can only be a few such cases, because most states would prefer stability to instability, and 2) the effect would be to continually bleed everybody involved, including the intervening countries. The goal in these types of instances, I posit, is to stop the fighting on terms favorable to the intervener, and in doing so bring stability to the region. I do not deny that there are multiple goals behind any intervention, but argue that very often the first step in achieving these other goals is the cessation of hostilities.

Taking a narrow view of success defined in terms of stopping the fighting might lead one to be critical of anything that flows from such a definition. The effectiveness of any military or economic intervention must be judged in terms of a multi-dimensional outcome, one might argue. But if the definition has a reasonable -- albeit imperfect -- fit with our referent world then we can ask where such a definition, and the results that flow from it, might take us. Two areas seem to be worth briefly illuminating, one in terms of how it contributes to the formulation of policy; the other in terms of how it contributes to our understanding of conflict resolution and the general field of peace studies.

One of the difficulties faced by the policy making community is that they do not have a good \textit{ex ante} grasp of the strategies for intervening that will be increasingly likely to work, nor has the social science community done much to contribute to the necessary \textit{ex ante} knowledge. What decision makers need to
know when contemplating whether and how to intervene is what works under which types of conditions. The policy community furthermore, needs to be informed in a language with which they are familiar. In short they need a combination of policy relevance and analytical rigor. Defining the outcome of interventions in terms of multi-dimensional goals generally removes one critical element from the policy community: a dialogue in a language with which they are familiar. That language, I argue, is one of probabilistic estimates of potential outcomes. Multi-dimensional outcomes generally require scales, and scales lead to results expressed in terms of "units of change". A unit change on a nominal ordering of outcomes means little statistically and even less to a policy maker. So we abbreviate the observed outcome by dichotomizing it, and in doing so we throw away information, though not necessarily forever. What we gain from the dichotomization is the ability to give policy makers probabilistic estimates of what works to stop the fighting under a given set of conditions. They can then evaluate how likely it is that stopping the fighting will allow then to achieve their other goals.

Another direction to push this analysis if one feels dissatisfied with a narrow conception of success is in terms of what stopping the fighting buys the world community. If we can effectively stop the fighting in the short-term, what are the prospects for the longer-term resolution of the conflict? Those interested in the distribution of resources, issues of identity and security rights, or the curtailment of human rights violations might expand on this analysis to ask how short-term settlements effect long-term resolution, and ultimately our global community. A long term comparative analysis across those successful and unsuccessful interventions -- as well as the cases of non-intervention -- may shed light on the broader issues associated with military or economic interventions. This will remain a task for future research but it is consistent with much of the literature on conflict resolution and diplomatic interventions (e.g., Kriesberg, 1994; Zartman, 1995).

Under these conditions operationalizing success is a particularly thorny topic. First, what is meant by success is crucial to evaluating the alternative strategies available to decisionmakers. Singer's (1963) concept of a preferred future behavior is useful, as is Licklider's (1993) definition of the end of civil wars. He considers a civil war to have ended when either multiple sovereignty ends or the violence is terminated.
for five years. This definition, however, is overly restrictive given the political expediencies associated with intervening in ongoing civil strife.

When we consider that intervening in civil conflicts involves decisions made by political leaders, the concept of "success" must understood accordingly. Political leaders generally cannot make policies regarding interventions with a five year time horizon, as would be consistent with Licklider's definition. Political forces dictate otherwise. The short-term time frame, moreover, is a function of expectations at the time of the intervention, even though the actual policy may play out over multiple years (e.g., Vietnam and Afghanistan). Obviously miscalculations are sometimes made. When we talk about third party interventions into intra-state military contests, success must be conceived of in terms of either stopping the fighting or resolving the underlying dispute. The latter would make the barriers to success impossibly high relative to the tools employed, while political imperatives dictate that policies have a short-term horizon. Success in this analysis will be operationalized as the cessation of military hostilities for a period lasting at least six months. This definition adopts the same frame of reference for the end of militarized dispute identified in the Correlates of War data (Bremer, Jones, and Singer 1997), and fits with the first half of Diehl's (1993) two part definition of successful peacekeeping interventions. While stopping the fighting for this relatively short period of time would rarely even approach a resolution of the underlying issues at stake, six months without military hostilities can a) give policymakers cause to claim success with their policy, and b) give a sufficient break in the fighting to initiate meaningful dialogue in an effort to resolve the underlying causes of the conflict. The post-Dayton interventions in Bosnia had a clearly defined short-term idea of a successful outcome: stopping the violence. What seemed equally clear is that the fighting had to stop before political and social changes could occur. The failed record of the UN and European Union mediation attempts while the fighting was underway attests to the usefulness of stopping the fighting. As we saw earlier, most decisions over when, where, how, or whether to intervene involve some calculation of potential costs and benefits (whether formally or informally); the political aspects of these costs shape the terms of the engagement. Since it is likely that costs will increase with time while benefits under the very best of circumstances (at least to the political leadership) remain constant, optimal strategies for intervention will
have short time horizons. It is more likely, however, that this short time frame is exacerbated by declining benefits over time relative to the costs, adding even greater impetus to design intervention strategies that have a reasonable expectation of being successful in the short-term.

The Value of this Project to the Policy and Peace Studies Communities

Given the increased interest in containing and resolving civil conflicts around the globe, as well as the increasing numbers of such conflicts in the post-Cold War era (Gurr, 1994, 1993), policymakers could be well served by access to systematically generated guidelines to help focus the decision process. Although any research like this will never be the panacea and cannot replace sound, logical reasoning during the decisionmaking process, systematic research can guide the deliberative process. Think of the number of times that blunders were made when at minimum anecdotal evidence was available to point toward the impending policy debacle (Neustadt and May, 1986).

Policymakers face two conflicting hurdles when trying to formulate strategies for advancing national security by intervening in civil conflicts. On the one hand they confront domestic constituencies that have an interest in the cessation of hostilities in their homeland. Ignoring ethnic homogeneities may come with political perils. The tacit support by the United States of the Catholic faction in the Northern Ireland struggle may attest to the political ramifications of ignoring constituencies with ties to their mother country. On the other hand, the general public is rather loath to commit resources in some distant land -- particularly if the potential for human casualties is high -- when there are problems on the home front that deserve attention. These competing pressures from the domestic community on decisionmakers trying to formulate policy can result in a tenuous balancing act. But domestic forces are only one part of the equation. The security elite charged with formulating foreign policy must put issues of national security at the forefront of their deliberative processes, and in doing so give short attention to the domestic considerations. The ministry or department of foreign affairs is not charged with catering to domestic constituencies (Kennan, 1993). The role of weighing the relative influence of domestic and international concerns falls on the shoulders of the chief executive, who harbors an abiding interest in being both effective in the foreign policy realm and
responsive at home. The results of the analysis outlined in this book contributes to the ability to juggle these factors effectively.

In this juggling of national security and domestic concerns the most costly outcome is to intervene and have that intervention fail. For the most part the decision as to when, where, and how to intervene is one in which decisionmakers try to make well-informed speculations based on analogies to past policies. Analogical reasoning, however useful, is prone to faulty perceptions or the reliance on inappropriate cases. If policymakers had a blueprint in which the characteristics of the conflict, the strategy for intervening, and the likely outcome were considered in a way that suggested the probability of successful outcomes given certain conditions, then this would constitute a significant advance in the policymaking process. Alexander George (1995) argues that answers to these types of questions are at the forefront of the needs of foreign policy managers, and that social science needs to forge closer links with the policy community. Equally important is a clearer understanding of when and when not to intervene. Appropriately used this research should provide policymakers with just such a set of guidelines. Although no social science research -- whether based on qualitative or quantitative evidence -- results in deterministic policy prescriptions (i.e., identifying a policy option that will always be successful under a given set of conditions) as a result of this project we can give prescriptive advice based on a probabilistic understanding of what worked and what did not in the recent past. At minimum the following chapters make evident those conditions under which an intervention strategy is unlikely to be effective. This should facilitate decisionmakers' ability to at least avoid the blunders, if not tailor successful strategies. By informing the decisional calculus this work can influence the way that decisionmakers think about interventions into civil conflicts. Their need to juggle domestic and international considerations will not change, but their ability to do so in an informed manner should.

Organization of the Book

The outline of the book will follow what seems like a logical ordering of events in the decision process, moving from the decision over whether to intervene to the most effective strategy under a given set of conditions once that choice has been made in the affirmative. The bulk of these chapters will adopt the
perspective of a decision over a unilateral intervention with a very narrow goal. The analysis will start with Chapter 2 describing the data to be used and the distribution of cases across regions, intervention strategies, and types of conflicts. One way to view these historical descriptions is as a snapshot of the conditions faced by policy makers, their strategies for intervening, and the degree to which they have been successful for their efforts. Chapter 3 will pose the question of when states choose to intervene. It is clear that not all civil conflicts suffer the fate (or virtue) of outside interventions, and that states self-select themselves into or out of interventions for a variety of identifiable reasons. In order to fully evaluate the effectiveness of intervention strategies we first have to know when states choose to do otherwise. The Fourth Chapter will then examine the conditions under which various forms of intervention are likely to achieve a successful outcome. This is the central focus of the book. Currently there is remarkably little systematic information with which to understand the outcome of interventions, or to guide the policy community. The advances here are significant over what our current state of knowledge has to offer. In combination chapters 3 and 4 identify the conditions under which interventions are likely to be chosen and the strategies and circumstances that result in the greatest probability of successful outcomes.

Chapter 5 will take a different tack and examine the role played by multilateral interventions and the accompanying multifaceted strategies that can unfold under their auspices. Many would argue that stopping the fighting is far too narrow a goal for intervening countries, and to some degree the evidence supports this argument. The most clearly visible instances where stopping the fighting is a goal with very little relevance to the decision process can be seen in peacebuilding efforts carried out under the auspices of the United Nations, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), or multilateral organizations (European Union, Organization of African Unity, etc.). In such cases the objectives usually entail putting a country back on its feet after the cessation of hostilities, rather than putting an end to the fighting, and therefore involve mine sweeping operations, organizing elections, rebuilding roads, and outfitting hospitals. This chapter will pose the questions of who intervenes and why when the goals and implements for intervening are more broadly conceived. The final chapter will then wrap things up by summarizing what we have learned, point toward future research, and draw out implications for conflict studies and policymakers.
The Soviet Union, for example, came under increasing pressure from the general public as the conflict in Afghanistan waged on. Peace groups formed, comprised of mothers of soldiers, former soldiers, and members of the sympathetic public. One of President Gorbachev's first substantial foreign policy initiatives was to pull the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan.