1. INTRODUCTION: EFFACING THE CARICATURE

Even popular caricatures of philosophers serve important philosophical functions. By coordinating personae with ideas, they facilitate conversations involving matters that we would otherwise neglect. But one function they do not serve is generating consistency. And indeed, Nietzsche serves for us as both the transgressor of all boundaries and unmasker of all pretensions, and at the same time as the ultimate elitist who is available to us in modern culture. There are, of course, ways to reconcile these: perhaps anti-elitism is the last boundary that needs to be transgressed? I shall suggest here, however, that we would do better to efface this caricature somewhat, in order to get closer to a position that is both Nietzsche’s and more interesting than the caricature.

The aim of this paper is to clarify the grounds and content of Nietzsche’s elitism, such as it is. What I shall argue is that Nietzsche’s elitism has been profoundly misunderstood, and in ways that he himself anticipated. In particular, I wish to show that Nietzsche’s elitism is a function of his more general considerations about the availability of ethical authority, and is thus best understood as transcendental rather than substantive. Explicating this difference will comprise the whole of the paper, but I shall claim that Nietzsche’s elitism is transcendental in these senses: it responds to a question of right rather than presupposing an answer, and that it offers not a thick characterization of a form of social existence, but the necessary conditions for the phenomenon of Life to be possible.
The notion of *Life* plays a central role in Nietzsche’s mature thought. What is *Life*, according to Nietzsche? I cannot hope to resolve this matter here, but two interrelated elements stand out, and will suffice to support my explication of Nietzsche’s elitism: life as *estimating* and life as *activity*. Two well-known passages bring out these features:

Living – is that not precisely wanting to be other than this nature? Is not living – estimating [*Abschätzen*], preferring, being unjust, being limited, wanting to be different? (*BGE* 9; cf. *KSA* XI.26[72])

Thus the essence of life, its will to power, is ignored; one overlooks the essential priority of the spontaneous, aggressive, expansive, form-giving forces that give new interpretations and new directions … (*GM* II:12; cf. *GS* 349, *BGE* 259, *GM* I:11)

Nietzsche invokes his special notion of Life in support of a contrast: between merely reacting or responding to external causes, even where this promotes self-preservation, and shaping the world through self-relating, end-directed activity. This activity is self-relating in that activity, as opposed to mere reactivity, must involve the setting of one’s ends. And this purposiveness requires discrimination: some ends must be taken as better than others. These discriminations might be primitive and unconscious, but living as activity distinguishes itself from other sorts of events by this evaluative, selective, end-directedness.

This simplified picture of Life already includes not quite an elitism, but at least a hierarchy. Life as estimating and as activity requires a *hierarchy of ends*. This, of course, is not elitism in any typical sense. Elitism typically involves a hierarchy of persons qua persons – or perhaps qua certain particular roles – and not merely a rank-ordering of ends, however hierarchical that ranking may be.
Here, however, I wish to invoke a general principle that has been fairly common at least since Rousseau and Schiller and which, in any case, Nietzsche, too, affirms. I call it the Principle of Interdependence of Self and Ends. As its name suggests, this vaguely existentialist, vaguely pragmatist principle claims that what one is and what one wants are interdependent. There is a relatively clear formulation of this principle in Beyond Good and Evil:

The values [Werthschätzungen] of a human being betray [verrathen] something of the structure of his soul and where it finds its conditions of life, its true need. (BGE 268; cf. D 326, D 552, GM P:1, GM I:13, A 13)

What relationship, exactly, “betray” marks out is unclear, but it is well-testified, I think, that for Nietzsche there is a complex, bidirectional relationship between “soul” and “values.”

What I now wish to suggest is that the hierarchy of ends and the Principle of Interdependence of Self and Ends are sufficient to generate a kind of elitism. This is Intrapersonal Elitism: one recognizes, within oneself as it were, hierarchical distinctions of rank among selves, whether actual or possible. One encounters Intrapersonal Elitism in Nietzsche’s talk of one’s “higher self”3 and also, for example, in the occasional discussion of willing:

That which is termed “freedom of the will” is essentially the affect of superiority in relation to him who must obey: “I am free, ‘he’ must obey” – this consciousness is inherent in every will; and equally so the straining of the attention, the straight look that fixes exclusively on one aim, the unconditional evaluation that “this and nothing else is necessary now,” the inward certainty that obedience will be rendered – and whatever else belongs to the position of the commander. A man who wills commands something within himself that renders obedience, or that he believes renders obedience. (BGE 19)

This kind of elitism is, to be sure, atypical. But it contains every element that one would expect of elitism: a relationship of superiority, “unconditional evaluation,” commanding, and a demand for obedience. As Nietzsche portrays it, furthermore, this elitism is quite general. It involves an affect that is “inherent in every will.”
I now wish to suggest that Nietzsche affirms another principle that contributes to explaining his elitism. This principle, which I shall call the *Principle of Personal Indifference*, is actually mundane. According to the Principle of Personal Indifference, merely numerical difference among persons makes no difference with respect to evaluative commitments. This of course is not to say something vaguely Kantian, such as that one should adopt commitments that bind everyone equally; nor is it to say something vaguely utilitarian, such as that the distinction among persons is morally irrelevant. Rather, this principle merely holds that from one’s own first-person standpoint, one’s evaluative commitments hold independent of their association with any particular individuals; one’s commitments are, in this limited sense, impersonal. Nietzsche typically associates this principle very closely with his elitism:

“You shall obey – someone and for a long time: *else* you will perish and lose the last respect for yourself” – this appears to me to be the moral imperative of nature which, to be sure, is neither “categorical” as the old Kant would have it (hence the “else”), nor addressed to the individual (what do individuals matter to her?) but to people, races, ages, classes – but above all to the whole human animal, to *man*. (*BGE* 188; cf. *BGE* 126)

… that what is right for one *cannot* by any means therefore be right for another, that the demand for one morality for all is detrimental to precisely the higher men, in short that there exists an order of rank between man and man, consequently also between morality and morality. (*BGE* 228)

The first passage expresses the principle as straightforwardly as we could expect from Nietzsche: individuals do not matter with respect to the moral imperative that wards off the loss of personal integrity. The second is occasionally taken as a kind of Protagorean relativism about morality, but really expresses the same point. What matters is that there is a single “order of rank,” at least from the standpoint of the “higher men,” that stands above individuals and even above moralities, and which renders impossible certain ways of ascribing particular responsibilities.

Thus we arrive at Nietzsche’s elitism. Intrapersonal Elitism, together with the Principle of Personal Indifference, generates *Interpersonal Elitism*, that there are hierarchical distinctions
among separate persons. All of this stems merely from Nietzsche’s characterization of Life. As activity and estimating, Life demands setting ends, which involves ranking ends, which involves allegiance to transindividual standards, which involves rankings among persons. This and nothing else is the elitism that Nietzsche’s position on Life commits him to. There are hierarchical, interpersonal standards.

At this point I wish to consider two possible criticisms of this reading of Nietzsche’s elitism. Although they are interrelated, I shall consider them separately. (1) The elitism that I have attributed to Nietzsche is so mundane that it is trivial. Everyone affirms this kind of elitism, and thus the interpretation that assigns it to Nietzsche is inadequate. (2) This reading of Nietzsche’s elitism is misleading because it implies that Nietzsche is exclusively a philosophical elitist in this sense. Nietzsche may very well be an elitist in the sense that I have identified, but what is distinctive about Nietzsche’s position is, perhaps, a much more intense form of elitism.

To the first criticism, that the identified form of elitism is so mundane as to be universally affirmed, Nietzsche’s answer, I think, is Yes and No. As I have characterized it, Nietzsche’s elitism stems out of the necessary conditions of Life: estimating and activity. Since it stems out of these conditions, such an elitism must indeed be universal; this is precisely Nietzsche’s point. At the same time, however, Nietzsche thinks that this has been repressed in a particularly destructive way. We have become so deeply resistant to admitting any kind of ethical distinction that we fail to understand our own inevitable elitism. Christianity and Hegelianism, in particular, have brought this on us by setting forth senses in which every person equally is the locus for some kind of distinctively moral worth – expressed, perhaps, in terms of spiritual inheritance or freedom or completely mutual recognition. And this is why Nietzsche finds the Platonic-Christian-Hegelian-Socialist-Democratic movement so disturbing: given the grouping,
obviously not because of any specific practices or institutional forms, but because of a kind of transcendental point: it promotes misunderstanding about what its own conditions are.

Nietzsche’s elitism thus involves an attempt to clear this up:

equality of souls before God is a falsehood and a mere pretext for the rancor of the baseminded …. (A 62)

This state is actually encountered in Europe today: I call it the moral hypocrisy of those commanding. They know no other way to protect themselves against their bad conscience than to pose as the executors of more ancient or higher commands …. (BGE 199)

The “pose” and the “pretext,” rather than the practices, are what are fundamentally troubling.

Indeed, part of the trouble with the equality-movement is that, by being hypocritical about power, it allows particularly stupid forms of domination to crowd out the productive ones.

Nietzsche can, in any case, both claim that his position is generally affirmed and that pointing this out serves an important critical function because his complaint is not a first-order one. As is typical of Nietzsche, his concern lies with the ethics of an ethics. The higher-order view about moral value in which it is universally available and in certain respects unconditional is harmful because it subverts the availability of first-order values. The repression of elitism muddles the evaluative distinctions that are necessary for flourishing in general:

everything evil, terrible, tyrannical in man, everything in him that is kin to beasts of prey and serpents, serves the enhancement of species “man” as much as its opposite does. (BGE 44)

“No more masters and no more servants” has no allure for us. We simply do not consider it desirable that a realm of justice and concord should be established on earth (because it would certainly be a realm of the deepest leveling) … We think about the necessity for new orders, also for a new slavery – for every strengthening and enhancement of the human type also involves a new enslavement. (GS 377; cf. HH I:441, BGE 188)

These passages do not make substantive recommendations for practices; rather, they identify the requirements for “enhancement.” Among these requirements is a “new enslavement,” that is to say, I think, a new kind of enslavement. Every enhancement meets such a requirement, so this
presumably applies to past as well as future enhancements. Nietzsche’s suggestion is thus not that we make a transition to an elitist way of life, but that we always, by necessity, in some sense, have one, and that failing to recognize this takes away the very possibility of giving ourselves a better existence. Inventing a “new” kind of enslavement to replace the old kind perhaps requires some self-consciousness of what one is doing.

The second criticism that I wanted to address was that, although Nietzsche may be an elitist in the sense that I identified, what is distinctive about his position is a much more intense or more direct elitism. I cannot of course prove the negative, that Nietzsche intends no other sense of elitism than the one that I suggest, but all of the considerations that Nietzsche advances in support of his elitism are conditioned along the lines of the claims that I had just identified: first, elitism is necessary for something and second, the necessity in question is that some sense of rank-ordering be sustained, not that a particular rank order be enforced. The former claim suggests that Nietzsche sees elitism as susceptible to justificatory demands. One can ask of Nietzsche’s position why it counts as authoritative; his answer about elitism here is that it counts as authoritative only insofar as it is necessary for something and also insofar as that final end is authorized. The latter claim suggests that Nietzsche has little to say about any particular kind of subordination or hierarchy. His concern lies with “higher problems,” as this passage about pity indicates:

And that your pity is for the “creature in man,” for that which has to be formed, broken, forged, torn, burned, annealed, refined – that which has to suffer and should suffer? And our pity – do you not grasp whom our opposite pity is for when it defends itself against your pity as the worst of all pampering and weakening? – Pity against pity, then! – But to repeat, there are higher problems than the problems of pleasure and pain and pity; and every philosophy that treats only of them is a piece of naïveté. (BGE 225)

There are justificatory issues in play: hierarchical pity needs to “defend itself” against sympathetic pity. And the only considerations that Nietzsche thinks are available for such a
defense are higher-order ones. His critique of sympathetic pity is not that pain and suffering is, on the contrary, attractive; his critique of sympathetic pity is that it fails to address higher-order concerns that can only be resolved with a different outlook. In any case, since only higher-order considerations would contribute to a resolution, Nietzsche has no basis for an appeal to a more substantive elitism.

The danger of anti-elitism in its various forms is not simply that elitism is neglected, but that the processes in which human agency takes its shape are disrupted. Elitism is a systematic feature of the context in which “spirit” sets directions and grows, and Nietzsche typically expresses this with the standard telic metaphor:

But the fight against Plato or, to speak more clearly and for “the people,” the fight against the Christian-ecclesiastical pressure of millennia — for Christianity is Platonism for "the people" — has created in Europe a magnificent tension of the spirit the like of which has never yet existed on earth: with so tense a bow we can now shoot for the most distant goals. To be sure, European man experiences this tension as need and distress; twice already attempts have been made in the grand style to unbend the bow — once by means of Jesuitism, the second time by means of the democratic enlightenment which, with the aid of freedom of the press and newspaper-reading, might indeed bring it about that the spirit would no longer experience itself so easily as a “need.” (BGE pref)

The spirit depends on its capacity to shoot for distant goals. This internal tension depends on preserving rank differences, at least that between the location of the bow and that of its target. Since this tension is experienced as “need and distress,” there are always pressures to alleviate it. But the tension has its own, superior way of removing itself: the spirit achieving its goal. There is, strangely, a kind of anti-elitism implicit in elitism, since in hitting the target “we” collectively accomplish a transformation.

For this process to go forward, the tension must be sustained, and this is why Nietzsche precisely cannot advocate a specific order of rank. It would be counterproductive to maintain a single, permanent set of distinctions; it would go against the dynamics of life. Evaluating,
setting a direction, and acting requires a will for things to be different. Nietzsche’s elitism thus calls for an ongoing process of setting oneself apart:

The cleavage between man and man, status and status, the plurality of types, the will to be oneself, to stand out -- what I call the *pathos of distance*, that is characteristic of every strong age. The strength to withstand tension, the width of the tension between extremes, becomes ever smaller today … (*TI* “Skirmishes” 37; cf. *BGE* 262)

Nietzsche cannot offer a substantive elitism not only because that would beg the authority question that he wishes to address, but also because any substantive elitism would, by the terms of his own account, only generate its own self-overcoming.

3. THIRD PERSON: THE PROBLEM OF AUTHORITY

What I have suggested so far is that Nietzsche offers an account of why we should recognize hierarchical distinctions among persons: because such recognition is internal to the conditions for life. This does not, however, compel a particular hierarchy. Nietzsche does not argue by presupposing a particular rank-ordering and then demanding that it be better recognized, but by trying to figure out how any way of life – including an anti-elitist one – could be authoritative at all. And what Nietzsche points to as indispensable is that there be some process of setting up ethical distinctions and making them authoritative.

At the same time, hierarchy does not take a generalized shape: it comes in specific forms. So even if Nietzsche’s elitism is *primarily* a higher-level point, it should have some implication for first-order practice. In this section, I intend to clarify these implications by offering Nietzsche’s responses to three questions: Should everyone try to be elite? Are some people simply better than others? Should society be organized for the sake of higher persons?
Should everyone try to be elite? No. Nietzsche occasionally expresses puzzlement that anyone would want to be elite, but even assuming that it were desirable, it would be counterproductive, according to Nietzsche, for everyone to aspire to elite status. We cannot all be co-aspirants, for aspirations depend on the majority playing a supporting role:

A high culture is a pyramid: it can only stand on a broad base; its first presupposition is a strong and soundly consolidated mediocrity. (A 57; cf. GM III:18, BGE 257)

For Nietzsche, authority is socially conditioned. It depends for its existence on a context of contestation and acknowledgement. Elites and elitism thus rely on the “broad base” of the pyramid to make demands upon and to support their authority claims. To coin a slogan, there is no Gesetzgeben without an Untergehen – where “Untergehen” does not mean “perish,” but submit to a social process, however hierarchical, of adjudication. There must be an Under for authority claims to be possible, so we cannot all hope to be elites; the process depends on entrenched social differences, both between high and low and between suitable competitor and suitable competitor, for its functioning.

This is perhaps helpfully contrasted with an opposing picture of rank authority, in which it is a natural given. One feature of such a view is that it views rank atomistically, rather than as a matter of social structure. Whereas in the social view, everyone is in some sense better off when some are not as well off as others, in the atomistic view it is a contingent matter of universal regret that we are not all superior. Rank as natural would beg any question of the authority of the ranking, and at least make it sensible to wish that everyone were better. But this is not Nietzsche’s position. Consider one such attribution, from John Richardson’s recent book:

Nietzsche defends these castes as merely acknowledging natural differences among us; so A 57: “The order of castes, the rank order, merely formulates the highest law of life itself, the separation of these types is necessary for the preservation of society, for making possible a higher and a highest type.”
There is doubtless some sense of “natural” (or “merely natural”) that is appropriate here; society and life are, for Nietzsche, fully natural phenomena. But it would not be linguistically possible to make the transcendental point any more clearly. The higher-order matter of “the separation” rather than a particular rank ordering is at issue. Some such separation is necessary for the possibility of something, namely higher types. These higher types have an essential structural role: they preserve society. And rank ordering has a sanction, that of expressing a demand of life. Take that, Richardson!

The second question that I wished to address was, Are some people simply better than others? The answer to this qualified question is a qualified No. The idea that there is a single metric along which to measure the worth of persons is a Platonic-Christian-Hegelian-Socialist-Democratic one; Nietzsche denies that there is such a metric rather than inverting it. For Nietzsche, although elitism may hold in general, hierarchies have become so plural and incommensurable that blunt comparisons are difficult or impossible. At the most basic level, Nietzsche suggests that higher/lower and better/worse stand in tension: the former do not mark out superiority, but something like standing in a higher-order relation to the rest of humanity, so that “the higher the type, the less likely that he will turn out well” (BGE 62). More generally, Nietzsche promotes not one elite, but a whole menagerie of them: higher persons, geniuses, nobles, free spirits, attempters, legislators, the profound, the healthy, the active, and so on. In Nietzsche’s philosophy of history, elitism has itself produced an explosion of new possibilities for elitism:

Every enhancement of the type “man” has so far been the work of an aristocratic society …. Without that pathos of distance which grows out of the ingrained difference between strata … the other, more mysterious pathos could not have grown up either – the craving for an ever new widening of distances within the soul itself, the development of ever higher, rare, more remote, further-stretching more comprehensive states – in brief, simply the enhancement of the type “man” …. (BGE 257)
Elitism, as finding its place within the soul, has become ever more complex and ever more ideal. The “great thought” that can, exclusively, “give a deed or a cause greatness” (*BGE* 241), is now far more important than cruder forms of domination, with the result that the hierarchies that still matter might be captious, subtle, and multiple ones.

The increasing idealization of elitism raises another point that qualifies any answer to question #2, that anyone’s superior status is tenuous and provisional:

The striving for distinction is the striving for domination over the next man, though it be a very indirect domination and only felt or even dreamed. There is a long scale of degrees of this secretly desired domination, and a complete catalogue of them would be almost the same thing as a history of culture, from the earliest, still grotesque barbarism up to the grotesqueries of over-refinement and morbid idealism. (*D* 113; cf. *D* 548)

History reveals a long chain of domination, from whacking people with cudgels to “morbid idealism.” This shows, among other things, that even with the endurance of elitism, what counts as betterness is always up for grabs. By identifying versions of elitism as grotesque and over-refined, Nietzsche suggests that versions of elitism are subject to criticism. Elitism, accordingly, is not per se good, but only when it meets standards that it is Nietzsche’s enterprise to account for. The so-called philosophers of the future can suggest specific substantive elitisms, but Nietzsche, in the meantime, offers explanations of how better versions of betterness could be available. This, incidentally, connects with Nietzsche’s account of the lapse of the ascetic ideal into nihilism. In that story, the version of betterness in which worseness counts as betterness collapses, leaving in place a refusal of betterness that does not even take itself as authoritative.

The third question that I raised was, Should society be organized for the sake of higher persons? The answer to this is obviously Yes. There remain, however, deep questions about what this means. This, I think, is the plainest statement of this aspect of Nietzsche’s elitism:
The essential characteristic of a good and healthy aristocracy, however, is that it experiences itself *not* as a function … but as their *meaning* and highest justification …. Their fundamental faith simply has to be that society must *not* exist for society’s sake but only as the foundation and scaffolding on which a choice type of being is able to raise itself to its higher task and to a higher state of being. (*BGE* 258)

There are a number of different explanatory notions invoked here, but they are all telic in character: they all contribute to a claim about the *purpose* of an aristocracy or society, at least by their own lights. This kind of “for the sake of” is not the usual stuff of political philosophy, so it is worthwhile to consider finding a more straightforward sense of what this means. Here we can make a series of distinctions about the ways in which social choices work. A society could *enact* a particular result by the letter of the law – in this case, I suppose, it would be that there is a healthy aristocracy. A society could similarly *promote* a result, such as the way that the mortgage interest deduction in the United States is supposed to promote home ownership. Policies could merely *engender* a result, as is perhaps the case with tax policies and inequalities of wealth. Or a society, through its policies whether explicit or implied, could simply *allow* something, such as I think is the case with foot fetishes. Which of these does Nietzsche think is the appropriate relation of society to higher types?

That was a trick question. That Nietzsche thinks higher types should be enacted or “legislated”¹⁰ into existence is not an unpopular answer; and we might take “promote” as a slightly hedged version of this response. But I think it is inconceivable that Nietzsche would think that public institutions could be capable of performing the tasks that he had in mind. That would be a lengthy argument, however, so here is a shorter one. According to Nietzsche, the philosopher is “of necessity a man of tomorrow and the day after tomorrow”(*BGE* 212).

Commanders and legislators in general are always *untimely*: they can never command and legislate now. And for just this reason, I think, social policy will be useless in creating higher
types: what is required is someone who will institute something so novel that it cannot possibly be recognized as significant now. We can also quickly eliminate the "allow" reading as much too weak, and this leaves "engender." But this, too, is wrong. Nietzsche’s demand on society is not merely that it produces a certain output, but that its point is of a certain kind. A results-oriented notion such as "engender" does not capture Nietzsche’s telic interest. Nietzsche’s demand on society is at once both more and less demanding than engendering higher types. It is less demanding in that Nietzsche does not charge anyone or any group in particular with producing the desired result. But it is more demanding in that the desired result would be by itself inadequate. Nietzsche demands that the whole system of society be organized for the sake of the greatest possible human flourishing, not by specific entanglements with individual agency, which would be counterproductive, but by changing the meaning of social life. Nietzsche, in other words, seems to be a kind of liberal.

Although Nietzsche does seem to both believe that our common life should be organized for the sake of individual perfection, and that public institutions have almost no direct role in bringing this about, it might not be worth pressing his liberalism too far. This nevertheless brings out one feature of Nietzsche’s elitism: there are no necessary accompaniments to rank. Higher rank can take on so many different forms that it can take on no particular form at all, such that all one has is the higher status, and not political power, wealth, social privilege, fame, or speed in getting one’s articles through peer review. Nietzsche, in fact, frequently depicts paradoxical situations in which the very mark of high status is suffering loss:

The inclination to disparage himself, to let himself be robbed, lied to and exploited, could be the self-effacement of a god among men. (BGE 66; cf. WS 284)

It is not unthinkable that a society might attain such a consciousness of power that it could not allow itself the noblest luxury possible to it – letting those who harm it go unpunished. (GM II:10; cf. GM I:10)
More generally, Nietzsche associates privilege with responsibility (e.g. BGE 272), and this is why his elitism can take on a wide range of social forms. The most hierarchical values could call for egalitarian public institutions: to take charge of the fate of the lowly, to create a forum for competition, to obviate ressentiment, to make individual desert more transparent, to focus everyone’s attention on important things, or for some other reason. Even Jesus’ solution in the Gospels, that one becomes master by serving, counts as a relevant form of elitism, even if one that was ultimately unsuccessful. Nietzsche, in fact, twice claims that only in virtue of his elitism is it genuinely possible to love one’s enemies (BGE 216, GM I:10). Elitism, as a function of life, also conditions the possibility of generosity of spirit.

4. CONCLUSION

I have tried to clarify the content of Nietzsche’s elitism by offering a number of contrasts that occasionally go unrecognized. Nietzsche’s elitism, I claim, concerns the meaning of practices rather than the concrete practices themselves, it is systemic rather than atomistic, it explains the functioning of a system rather than prescribing a fundamental revision of that system, it explains the authority of rank distinctions rather than identifying intrinsically authoritative distinctions, it supports hierarchy in general rather than specific rank-orderings, and it allows for a multiplicity of hierarchies rather than merely a single metric of human worth. What unifies Nietzsche’s positions with respect to all of these contrasts is the transcendental character of his arguments. Nietzsche does not presuppose a substantive elitism, but argues that a high-order elitism is necessary for the possibility of Life, and thus resolves a justificatory burden.


5 See the Preface of *BGE*, quoted below; cf. *BGE* 202, 219.


9 Cf. the similarly dynamic, hierarchical, and transcendental account of power in Foucault (1990 [1976]: 93): “Power’s condition of possibility … must not be sought in the primary existence of a central point … it is the moving substrate of force relations which, by virtue of their inequality, constantly engender states of power, but the latter are always local and unstable” (in *The History of Sexuality: An Introduction*, Robert Hurley trans. (New York: Vintage Books, 1990 [1976]), p. 93).


11 Cf. A 3, where Nietzsche contrasts what the result of a process is (“what shall succeed mankind”) with what its point is (“what type of man shall be bred”).

12 I am grateful to the late-night Portland audience and especially to John Richardson, conversations with whom before, during, and after the session improved this paper.