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   I. Points of View, Paraconsistent Logic, and Paradox

    Science Generates Limit Paradoxes,

          Eric Dietrich and Chris Fields, Axiomathes March 2015.

     The Bishop and Priest: Toward a point-of-view based epistemology of true contradictions.

           (2008).  Logos Architekton, v. 2, n. 2, pp. 35-58.

II. Consciousness

    The Paradox of Consciousness and the Realism/Anti-Realism Debate

        Eric Dietrich and Julietta Rose (2009).  Logos Architekton, v. 3, n. 1, pp. 7-37.

   

    Introduction to Sisyphus's Boulder: Consciousness and the Limits of the Knowable.
        Eric Dietrich and Valerie Hardcastle (2005). John Benjamins.  And see this .

    A Connecticut Yalie in King Descartes' Court:A review of Mind and Mechanism by
        Drew McDermott. 

        Eric Dietrich and Valerie Gray Hardcastle (2002).  Newsletter of the  Cognitive

        Science Society.  June, 2002.

    Consciousness and the Limits of Our Imaginations.
        Eric Dietrich and Anthony Gillies (2001).   Synthese v. 126, n. 3, pp. 361-381.

    Zombies only seem logically possible:  or How consciousness hides the truth of
        Materialism: A Critical Review of The Consciousness Mind by David Chalmers.
        (1998). Minds and Machines, 8 (3), pp. 441-461.

    Let’s Dance! The Equivocation in Chalmers’ Dancing Qualia Argument. 

        Bram Van Heuveln,  Eric Dietrich, Michiharu Oshima,  Minds and Machines,

        8, pp. 237- 249  (1998).

3. III.Analogy and Conceptual Change
   
    Analogical insight: Toward unifying categorization and analogy.
           Cognitive Processing,v 11, # 4 (2010), Page 331.
   
    The Prepared Mind: The role of representational change in chance discovery.
           Eric Dietrich, Art Markman, and Mike Winkley (2003). In Yukio Ohsawa and
           Peter McBurney (eds.) Chance Discovery by Machines, Berlin: Springer-Verlag,
   

4.         pp. 208-230
   
    Analogy and conceptual change, or You can't step into the same mind twice.
                (2000). In E. Dietrich and A. Markman (eds.) Cognitive Dynamics:
           Conceptual change in humans and machines. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum,
           pp. 265 – 294.
   

IV. Apocalyptic Philosophy

    There Is No Progress in Philosophy. (2011).  Essays in Philosophy, Vol. 12, No. 2,

        "Philosophy's Future: Science or Something Else?. 329-344. 

        Also available at  http://commons.pacificu.edu/eip/vol12/iss2/9 

   Homo sapiens 2.0: Building the better robots of our nature. (2011).
 In M. Anderson and S. Anderson, (eds.),  Machine Ethics, Cambridge University Press.

   After the Humans are Gone.  Philosophy Now, v. 61, May/June, 2007, 16-19.

  V. Computationalism and Representation

    Discrete Thoughts: Why cognition must use discrete representations
        Eric Dietrich and Arthur Markman (2003). Mind and Language. v. 18, n. 1, pp. 95-119.

    An ABSURDIST model vindicates a venerable theory
        (2003). Trends in Cognitive Sciences, v. 7, n. 2, pp 57-59.

    It Does So! Review of Jerry Fodor's The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The scope and
        limits of computational psychology.  (2001). AI Magazine v. 22, n. 4, pp. 141-144.

    Dynamical description versus dynamical modeling: Reply to Chemero,
        Eric Dietrich and Arthur Markman (2001). Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 5(8), p. 332.

    Extending the classical view of representation.
        Arthur Markman and Eric Dietrich (2000). Trends in Cognitive Science v. 4, n. 12, 

        pp. 470-475.

    Cognitive Science and the Mechanistic Forces of Darkness, or Why the Computational
        Science of Mind Suffers the Slings and Arrows of Outrageous Fortune.
        (2000).   Techné:  eJournal of the Society for Philosophy and Technology, Winter.

     The role of the frame problem in Fodor's modularity thesis:  a case study of 

        rationalist cognitive science,    Eric Dietrich and Chris Fields (1995)..

              Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 7: 3. 

        Reprinted in Ford, K. and  Pylyshyn, Z. (eds.)  The Robot's Dilemma Revisited.  Ablex.

        pp. 9-24.

     Computationalism ,  (1990)  Social Epistemology, v. 4, n. 2, 135-154.

     Semantics and the Computational Paradigm in Cognitive Psychology. Synthese 79,

        119-141 (1989).

VI. Killing and Living

    The Allure of the Serial Killer. 
        Eric Dietrich and Tara Fox Hall.  In Sara Waller (ed). Serial Killers and Philosophy,    

        John Wiley.

VII. Evolutionary Psychology

    On the Inappropriate Use of the Naturalistic Fallacy in Evolutionary Psychology.
        David Wilson, Eric Dietrich, and Anne Clark (2003).   Biology and Philosophy,

        v. 18, 669-682.

8. VIII.Cognitive Science and Pluralism
   

     Do nonclassical worlds entail dualism?

        Commentary on “Eigenforms, Interfaces and Holographic Encoding: Toward

        an Evolutionary Account of Objects and Spacetime,” by Chris Fields, et al.,

        Constructivist Foundations, vol. 12, #3.

     Explanatory Pluralism in Cognitive Science.  Rick Dale, E. Dietrich, A. Chemero.(2009) Cognitive Science, v. 33, no. 2, pp. 739-742.

IX.  JETAI Editorials

    Subvert the Dominant Paradigm!  A Review of Computationalism: New Directions
        Edited by Matthias Scheutz, 2002.

    Homo sapiens 2.0: Why we should build the better robots of our nature. 2001,

         13 (4), 323-328.

    Banbury Bound, or Can a machine be conscious? 2001, 13 (2), 177-180.

    Concepts: Fodor's little semantic BBs of thought -- A critical look at Fodor's theory

        of concepts. 2001, 13 (2), 89-94.

    AI, Concepts, and the Paradox of Mental Representation, with a brief discussion of
        psychological essentialism.  2001, 13 (1), 1-7.

    A Counterexample to All Future Dynamic Systems Theories of Cognition.   2000,

        12(2), 377-382.

    Dynamic systems and paradise regained, or how to avoid being a calculator.  1999,

        11(4), 473-478.

    Fodor's gloom, or What does it mean that dualism seems true? 1999, 11 (2), 145-152.

    AI, situatedness, creativity, and intelligence; or the Evolution of the little hearing bones.

        1996 8 (1), 1-6.

    AI and the Mechanistic Forces of Darkness 1995, 7 (2), 155-161.

    AI and the tyranny of Galen, or Why evolutionary psychology and cognitive ethology
        are important to AI. 1994, 6 (4), 325-330.